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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II there has been a significant trend all over the world for the 
general levels of trade barriers to fall. Conscious efforts, through international 
negotiations, have been made since then at all levels to promote fi-eer international trade. 
This movement for bringing down all types of visible and invisible trade barriers, 
which was spearheaded by the United States of America, was the result of the general 
desire of all the world nations at the end of the war not to repeat the retaliatory trade 
policies pursued during the 1930's and to avoid depressions many believe were caused, or 
exacerbated, by these policies. 
However, with" the expansion of trade over the past years, commercial disputes 
have also arisen. These disputes are typically concerned with specific conunodities and, in 
some cases, have led to the imposition of new barriers to replace those that have been 
removed. These trade disputes, thereby, have prompted the lawmakers in different 
countries to modify their trade laws or the administration of these laws to handle the 
changing circumstances. Dumping is one among such trade dispute and is one of the moot 
points in all international trade negotiations. 
Dumping! jg defined as selling a product in a foreign country at a price that is lower 
than the price charged by the same firm in its home market or at a price below costs of 
production. Sales of this type are defined in the U.S. law as sales at less than fair value. 
Almost all industrialized nations of the world now have laws against dumping which 
can penalize a foreign exporter who is found to have dumped its products in the importing 
'For an elaborate definition of dumping, see chapter II. 
2 
country. According to the United States antidumping laws, under certain conditions a 
special tariff may be imposed on foreign goods sold in the United States and priced at less 
than fair value. To have the special tariff imposed, it is necessary to show that dumping 
has caused or has threatened to cause material injury^ to the domestic industry. 
Ironically, on the one hand there have been worldwide efforts to bring down trade 
barriers, and ,on the other hand all types of invisible trade barriers such as antidumping 
and countervailing duties are being invented. Antidumping laws have also proven to be 
one type of invisible trade barrier. Most nations, as mentioned earlier, have laws against 
dumping because this type of protection is allowed even under the GATT rules. For this 
reason the number of antidumping cases processed each year are on the rise (see Table 1 
and 2). 
In the U.S. antidumping cases begin with a complaint filed simultaneously with the 
Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission. The complaint could 
come fi-om anyone, including the U.S. Secretary of Commerce; however, complaints are 
generally made by groups such as firms, trade unions, or industry associations which 
closely tied to the production of the good competing with the allegedly dumped 
merchandise. Included in the complaint are evidence that dumping may be occurring and 
data designed to illustrate injury or threat of injury. 
The International Trade Commission is an independent, quasi-judicial agency, 
headed by five commissioners, appointed by the president of the U.S., and staffed by 
economists and lawyers. The International Trade Commission investigates various 
trade-related issues and provides advice, based on its investigations, to the executive 
branch of the U.S. government. Its job with respect to antidumping cases is to investigate 
^There is no comprehensive definition of material injuiy. 
Table 1. Industrial Countries: Antidumping Investigations and Actions. 1981-'87 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Countries Invest! Action Invest! Action Invest! Action Invest! Action Invest! Action Invest! Action Invest! Action 
gations gations gations gations gations gations gations 
Australia 49 28 77 47 80 58 56 36 63 30 63 10 11 
Industrial Countries 34 14 55 25 59 44 30 26 38 15 35 7 8 
Developing Countries 15 11 20 20 21 13 21 10 19 12 20 3 3 
Centrally Planned - 3 2 2 " 1 5 ~ 6 3 8 
Econs. 
Canada 23 13 72 21 36 41 31 16 36 27 55 45 34 36 
Industrial Countries 12 8 54 10 27 29 20 9 18 16 21 18 21 20 
Developing Countries 8 1 15 7 7 10 8 5 12 8 30 17 lU 12 
Centrally Planned 3 4 3 4 2 2 3 2 6 3 4 10 3 4 
Econs. 
European Community 47 16 55 42 36 45 48 31 45 12 37 21 10 8 
Industrial Countries 9 18 18 9 11 12 16 9 9 9 11 9 2 3 
Developing Countries 3 5 15 4 9 12 5 6 16 1 8 - 4 1 
Centrally Planned 35 3 22 29 16 21 27 16 20 2 8 12 4 4 
Econs. 
United States 14 4 61 45 47 15 71 25 65 53 70 50 47 43 
Industrial Countries 7 3 47 41 27 9 32 8 19 19 30 15 32 25 
Developing Countries 4 " 13 3 19 6 23 17 41 20 34 32 13 10 
Centrally Planned 3 I 1 1 I 
--
16 
--
5 14 6 3 2 8 
Econs. 
Table 1 (Contd.) 
Total 133 61 265 155 199 159 206 108 209 122 225 126 102 87 
Industrial Countries 62 33 174 85 124 94 98 52 84 59 97 49 63 48 
Developing Countries 30 17 63 34 56 41 57 38 88 41 92 52 30 23 
Centrally Planned 41 17 28 36 19 24 51 18 37 22 26 25 9 16 
Econs. 
This table is taken from International Monetary Fund's Occasional Paper 63 (1988) "Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy". 
Sources; Finger and Olechowski (1987); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, "Semi-Annual Reports Under Article 14:4 of the Agreement" (Geneva), various issues. Based on 
GATT classifications (see Appendix III) 
The countries listed have initiated virtually all the antidumping investigations undertaken worldwide. Actions taken include the imposition of deflnitive duties and minimum price 
undertakings by exporting countries. Investigations include those opened in the context of reviewing an existing antidumping duty or after allegations of breach of an undertaking. 
The based on actidata are ons reported by signatories to the GATT Committee on Antidumping Practices, which exclude the actions taken against non signatories. 
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Table 2. United States Antidumping Cases 1980-1988 
By Country and Outcome 
(number of cases) 
Country VER Other 
Restrictive 
Total Not Restrictive 
Total 
All Cases 
Australia 1 0 1 1 2 
Austria 4 0 4 1 5 
Canada 6 8 14 7 21 
European Community; 66 20 86 41 127 
Belgium 7 2 9 1 10 
France 9 4 13 7 20 
Germany, F.R. 12 3 14 10 25 
Greece 0 0 0 1 1 
Italy 6 7 13 10 23 
Luxemburg 6 0 6 0 6 
Netherlands 5 1 6 3 9 
Portugal 1 1 2 0 2 
Spain 10 1 11 4 15 
United Kingdom 10 1 11 5 16 
Finland 4 0 4 0 4 
Japan 13 19 32 12 44 
New Zealand 0 1 1 1 2 
Norway 0 0 0 1 1 
South Africa 5 1 6 0 6 
Sweden 0 4 4 0 4 
Switzerland 0 0 0 4 4 
Eastern European Countries: 23 7 30 3 33 
Czechoslovakia 2 0 2 0 2 
Germany, D.R. 4 2 6 1 7 
Hungary 2 1 3 1 4 
Poland 6 0 6 0 6 
Romania 6 2 8 0 8 
USSR 0 1 1 1 2 
Yugoslavia 3 1 4 0 4 
6 
Table 2 (Cont'd) 
Developing Countries: 53 44 97 35 132 
Argentina 0 2 2 3 5 
Brazil 14 2 16 5 21 
Chile 0 2 2 0 2 
China 3 9 12 3 15 
Columbia 0 1 1 3 4 
Costa Rica 0 1 1 0 1 
Ecuador 0 1 1 0 1 
El Salvador 0 0 0 1 1 
Hong Kong 0 1 1 0 1 
India 0 2 2 1 3 
Iran 0 1 1 0 1 
Israel 0 2 2 1 3 
Kenya 0 1 1 0 1 
Korea 14 3 17 5 22 
Mexico 3 2 5 1 6 
Peru 0 0 0 1 1 
Philippines 0 1 1 0 1 
Singapore 0 2 2 2 4 
Taiwan 9 5 14 8 22 
Thailand 0 3 3 0 3 
Turkey 0 2 2 0 2 
Venezuela 10 1 11 I 12 
Totals 
All Countries 175 104 279 106 385 
Developed Countries 99 53 152 68 220 
Developing Countries 53 44 97 35 132 
Eastern European Countries 23 7 30 3 33 
Source: Finger and Murray (1990) 
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the question of injury. According to Husted and Melvin (1993), "the International Trade 
Commission collects data on various aspects of the domestic industry and on the prices 
and quantities of imports. What it looks for is evidence of a link between imports and 
certain industry characteristics that would suggest that imports of the dumped 
merchandise have been to blame for the state of the industry. These industry 
characteristics include losses in the following: sales, market share, profits, productivity, 
return on investment, and capacity utilization. The International Trade Commission also 
considers effects on employment, inventories, wages, and the ability to raise new capital. 
Once the data have been collected and analyzed, the six commissioners vote on the 
question of injury". 
While the International Trade Commission investigates injury, the Department of 
Commerce investigates whether dumping has actually occurred. The Department of 
Commerce has 160 days to make a preliminary assessment of the question, including a 
first guess as to the size of the dumping margin. If the Department of Commerce finds that 
there is evidence that dumping might exist, all imports of the product in question are 
immediately subject to an increased tariff equal to the estimated dumping margin. The 
Department of Commerce then begins a fiirther investigation of whether dumping has 
occurred and at the completion of the investigation makes a final ruling. If, after fiirther 
study, the Department of Commerce finds that dumping has not occurred, then the special 
duties that had been previously imposed are rebated. Otherwise, the process continues 
until the International Trade Conmiission makes its final ruling as to the extent of injury. 
If the International Trade Commission rules in its final report that injury has not 
occurred, then again the case is terminated and the special duties are rebated. If both the 
Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission rule in favor of the 
8 
petition, a permanent tarifP is put in place, equal to the dumping margin calculated by the 
Department of Commerce in its final investigation. 
There is a general impression that due to the political pressure efforts are made by 
the officials to find judgment in favor of the domestic complainant. Handley (1988,89) 
mentions situations where the EC investigation procedure appears to be biased in terms of 
finding dumping. According to Destler (1986), in the U.S. the Congress has sought to 
increase the rate at which the judgments are awarded in the antidumping cases. In 1980, 
under the pressure of the Congress, the responsibility of investigating the size of dumping 
margin was transferred fi-om the Treasury Department to the Department of Commerce. 
It was felt that as the chief advocate of business in the U.S., the Department of 
Commerce would be more aggressive in deciding dumping cases than the Treasury 
Department. The Department of Commerce was also advised to make greater use of 
constructed values rather than foreign prices in calculating fair value, presumably because 
the use of constructed value makes it more likely that dumping will be found. 
It would be safe to suggest that the use and abuse of the antidumping laws is rather 
fi-equent these days and more and more domestic producers are seeking sheher under 
these laws. This distorts the behavior of the exporting firms as we!! as the competing 
firms in the importing country in such a way that while the antidumping laws impose 
constraints on the foreign exporting firms, they give an edge to the domestic firm over its 
foreign rival. 
My objective, in the proceeding chapters, is to analyze the distorting effect of 
antidumping laws, i.e., how the presence of antidumping affects the behavior of firms in a 
simple duopoly setting. 
^Although the exporting firm has a right to appeal, there is no statutory time limit after which the 
Department of Commerece is supposed to revise the case. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Unfair trade practices are one of the main issues in the muhilateral (e.g. GATT), as 
well as the bilateral trade negotiations these days and dumping is a highly prominent issue 
in these talks. The term dumping, as used in the theory of international trade, is very 
controversial and it is subject to many different interpretations. 
The United States antidumping law defines dumping as a situation in which an 
importer's "fair value" exceeds the purchase price paid by the importer or exporter's sale 
price 
The 1967 GATT Antidumping Code, which is an elaboration of Article VI of the 
General Agreement, defines dumping as the selling of products at prices that are "less 
than the normal value of the products" A price is considered to be less than its normal 
value if the former is less than the price of the same product in the exporting country or, 
in the absence of such a domestic price, is less than either the highest price of the 
^The present antidumping law is contained in title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, which was enacted in the 
Trade Agreement At of 1979. The 1979 provisions superceded the Antidumping Act of 1921. 
^Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade entitled "Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duties" reads at paragraph 1: 
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which the products of one country are 
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be 
condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a 
Contracting Party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. For the purpose of this 
Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an exporting country at 
less than its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another 
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when 
destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, 
(b) in the absence of such a domestic price, is less than either 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course 
of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit. 
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differencees in conditions and terms of sale, for 
difierences in taxation, and for other differences affecting price comparability. 
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comparable product in a third country or the cost of production in the exporting country 
plus a reasonable markup. 
From an economist's point of view, dumping occurs when a firm sells below its 
marginal cost and not necessarily below average total cost because from standard 
textbook models we know that selling at a price below average total cost can be optimal 
for a competitive profit-maximizing firm if there are fixed costs. While spatial price 
discrimination is sufficient, it is not a necessary condition for dumping to occur. For 
example, a product is considered dumped even though the domestic price is lower than the 
export price, when they both are below cost. In this literature it is referred to as cost 
dumping. In circumstances where sales are made below the cost of production and the 
domestic market of the exporting country is small enough to be ignored, or when exports 
originate fi-om a non market economy, investigation of antidumping cases under the US. 
Trade Act requires "constructed value" methodology to determine dumping. Constructed 
value is defined as the cost of materials and processing plus a minimum of eight to ten 
percent margin for overhead and profits. Early antidumping laws were oflien defined on 
the basis of price discrimination, but later statutes have largely been in terms of "fair 
market price". 
Almost all the literature dealing with dumping in international trade is based on 
models of imperfect competition. This literature almost exclusively focuses on the 
positive analysis of dumping, i.e., why would a profit maximizing firm sell below its cost? 
The literature dealing with the subject of dumping can be broadly classified into two 
categories on the basis of the time context of the models: Static or one-period models, or 
dynamic or multi-period models. 
11 
Static Models 
The main theme of the results of the static/one-period models in the absence of any 
uncertainty, may be summarized as follows: it may be optimal for a profit maximizing firm 
to deliberately dump if: 
a. markets are segmented, i.e., if the dumped good cannot be sold back in the 
exporting country; otherwise the price difference cannot be maintained. 
b. exporting firm must have some market power in at least one of the markets. 
c. elasticity of demand in domestic and foreign markets are different, in particular 
demand elasticity in the export market must be higher than that at home. 
The "classic theory" of dumping was laid down by Viner (1923); Robinson (1933) 
described it as a discriminating monopolist's behavior. The Viner/Robinson explanation of 
dumping behavior is a simple application of the micro economic theory of price 
discrimination where a firm has no competition in two markets. If there is no market 
segmentation, the firm cannot discriminate against buyers in one market. Its optimal 
strategy then is to set a price for both markets at a level that maximizes its profits. Viner 
and Robinson demonstrate that if markets are segmented and price elasticities of demand 
are different in the two markets, then a firm can increase its profit above simple monopoly 
profits by setting different prices in the two markets. If the demand is more elastic in the 
export market, then profit maximizing behavior leads to dumping. 
Eichenegreen (1982) provides several plausible explanations as to why the 
elasticity of demand may differ across markets and may be higher in the export market. 
For example, there may be a competitive fiinge in one country, but not in another. 
12 
More recently, Brander and Krugman (1983) and Dixit (1988) have extended this 
idea to the cases of oligopoly or monopolistic competition. In these instances, firms must 
consider not only market demand elasticity but also the share of the market that it will be 
able to capture. The profit maximizing decisions are similar, but the marginal revenue is 
replaced with the perceived margin revenue. In these cases firms should also incorporate 
some notion of how competing firms respond to each others actions. 
Brander and Krugman (1983) developed a two- country duopoly model where 
each firm holds a Coumot type conjecture about the other firm's response to its own 
actions, i.e., the firm in each country assumes that the firm in the other country will not 
change its output in response to a change in output of the former. The market-
segmentation assumption remains very important so that each firm can choose profit 
maximizing output for each country separately. In this paper the rational for dumping 
comes fi-om the fact that transportation costs cause the cost of producing and selling 
abroad to be higher than in the domestic market. 
« 
The profit fiinction of home (H) and foreign (F) firms are 11 and n, respectively. 
I i= XP{Z)  + XP{Z)-C{X +  ^ /  )-<D 
* « « « # « 
n = KP (Z)+r p(Z) - Cixig+F) - o 
where Z (^) is the total amount of identical product that both firms produce and which is 
sold in the home (foreign) country. The variables with asterisks are associated with 
* 
country F, e.g., X is the country H's output sold in the country F and Y is the country F's 
13 
output sold in country F. And similarly X is country H's output sold in country H and Y 
is country F's output sold in country H. Brander and Krugman call the transportation 
• 
cost, c/g, an "iceberg" or spoilage type where g <1.^ and O in the above profit 
functions are fixed costs in country H and country F, respectively. Since symmetric 
conditions are assumed, it is sufficient to analyze one country. C is a scalar, i.e., 
C'(.) = C and C" = 0. The first order conditions for profit maximization in the country H 
for both firms give the reaction functions of the following type: 
H;, =Z.P' + P-C = 0 
= y.i" + P-C/g = 0 
When written in terms of demand elasticity e  = -PjZ.P'  and (a  =^) F's share 
in H's market, the following reaction functions are obtained 
p = ——— 
(£ + cr -1) 
p = —£±— 
gie-a)  
The above equations can be explicitly solved for P and a, under certain very 
plausible conditions. The solution to the above problem yields; 
a. in equilibrium, each firm has a positive share in the export market 
b. the markup on the export sales is always lower than that in the domestic market 
for each firm in equilibrium. These results are obtained due to the presence of 
14 
transportation costs and symmetry the authors have assumed which implies same price in 
both countries. 
Here Brander & Krugman use a different definition of dumping, which is having a 
higher markup in the domestic market than in the export market, i.e., adjusted for 
transportation costs. 
In a Coumot equilibrium, firms in each country dump in the market abroad. The 
duopoly rivalry of the firms causes intra- industry trade to take place and the presence of 
transportation cost forces each firm to earn a smaller mark up over its cost in the export 
market than at home. This is what the authors call reciprocal dumping. 
Dixit (1988) focuses not on the reasons for dumping, instead, his primary 
concerns are the implications of government policies in response to a foreign subsidy or 
dumping. The question he addresses is whether the foreign subsidy or dumping should be 
countervailed and if so, is there a distinction between optimal response to foreign dumping 
and subsidization? With the help of a conjectural variation model of oligopoly between 
domestic and foreign firms, selling only in the domestic market, he finds justification for 
partially countervailing the foreign subsidy but no rationale for countervailing dumping. 
Using linear demand fianctions. Dixit analyzes the cases of close substitutes and 
homogeneous goods; and in both cases, the results are qualitatively identical. The fiill 
optimal policy^ always calls for partial countervailing duties when the foreign government 
subsidizes production of its exporting firm, but lowering of tariff when foreign firms 
engage in aggressive competition or dumping that decrease domestic price. 
These results hold even if only one of either tariff or subsidy is available to the 
government as a policy instrument. The question that arises here is that if the foreign 
^The optimal policy is defined as the policy which maximizes the importing country's welfare when its 
government can use subsidy or tariff, or both together as policy instruments. 
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government knows the domestic government poUcy rule, then why would the foreign 
government subsidize its exporting firm when the subsidy is going to be extracted by the 
importing country through a countervailing tarifi? There are more plausible ways for the 
foreign government to try to support its exporting firms through some other methods not 
easily detectable by the importing country, e.g. through tax codes. The foreign 
government can disguise the subsidy in the form of a lump sum transfer to its exporting 
firm, not affecting the marginal cost of the firm. This would provide the exporting firm a 
cushion against any potential loss or bankruptcy if it sells its products below costs in the 
importing country. 
Such government transfers or guarantees by the government of some minimum 
profits, in case of bankruptcy threat, can significantly alter the optimal capital structure of 
the firms. This may enable a firm to be more flexible in its pricing or more aggressive in 
marketing its product in the export market. In Dixit's fi"amework, this will only lower the 
value of the conjectural variation parameter and, thus, there will be no justification for the 
importing country's policy makers to countervail the predatory actions of the exporting 
firms. 
In a world without uncertainty, dumping is always deliberate. Once uncertainty is 
introduced into the trading environments, dumping may be unintentional and the 
conditions mentioned earlier may no longer remain necessary for dumping to occur. Thus, 
market power is not a necessary condition, as it is quite possible for an exporter to act as a 
price taker at home and abroad, and yet sales may take place at different prices in 
different markets after the resolution of uncertainty. Simple exchange rate uncertainty can 
also produce this result. Krugman (1989) discusses cases in a different context where 
16 
firms keep the prices in the foreign market unchanged while their costs increase due to 
appreciation of home currency. This issue will be discussed in the next section. 
If a firm has some market-power, different elasticities are not necessary for 
dumping to occur. Again, some source of randomness at the time the export decisions 
are made can generate dumping ex-post. Blair & Cheng (1989) demonstrate that both 
marginal attitude towards risk and demand uncertainty abroad may cause a price setting 
firm to choose a price in the foreign market that is below than that in the home market 
even if price elasticities of demand in both markets are identical. 
Davis and McGuiimess (1982) also show that selling below marginal cost can 
occur because of uncertain demand. They argue that dumping can also occur when a firm 
tries to maximize sales subject to a profit-constraint or engages in a strategic behavior to 
deter entry into a market. In Devis and McGuinness model the producer has monopoly 
power in one of the markets. Almost all the models discussed earlier assume constant 
marginal cost for the analysis, the exceptions are Davies and McGuinness who use U-
shaped, and L-shaped cost curves. They show that in the presence of price uncertainty in 
the export market, pursuance of some managerial goals can lead a profit-maximizing firm 
to charge a price at home that is higher than that in the export market. 
Thus, even with the introduction of uncertainty in the models, market 
segmentation is still required for price differences to occur, though market structure and 
firms' strategy may then not be necessary as a determinant of dumping. 
Multiperiod Models 
As noted earlier, selling below average total cost can also constitute dumping, and 
it is not strictly necessary that export market prices be below domestic prices. The issue 
17 
of market-power and different price elasticities become irrelevant, as does the need for 
market segmentation. The cost dumping case is important in practice, because most 
exporters produce exclusively or predominantly for export. Often it may be in a firm's 
interest to sell below variable or even marginal cost for some time. Accepting losses in the 
short run may become a requirement for establishing bigger market share or to enable the 
firm to move down its learning curve, thereby increasing expected long run profits. Some 
multi-period dumping models find that it is rational for a firm to initially sell below its 
marginal cost if costs of production in the later periods are inversely related to the 
quantity produced in the earlier periods. This is called "learning by doing" in the 
literature. 
Gruensprecht (1988) highlights the importance of inter temporal linkages through 
the cost structure. With the help of a two-period duopoly model, where the two firms are 
located in two distant countries and produce a homogeneous product, Gruensprecht 
shows that when future costs are linked to current output levels, through either experience 
effect or adjustment costs, it may be optimal for an unconstrained firm to sell below 
current marginal cost. 
Ethier (1982) and Eichenegreen and Van der Ven (1984) find that a profit 
maximizing firm will set price below cost on an intermittent basis. In Eichenegreen and 
Van der Ven's (1984) model, firms choose to sell below cost on a cyclical basis to 
replenish their customer base. They demonstrate that the existence of cost of adjustment 
associated with changes in output level may cause firms to sell below cost. 
Ethier (1982) explores the motivation of a profit maximizing firm to set prices 
below its cost on cyclical basis. He found that it is optimal for a firm to dump in the 
periods when the economy is on a down svwng. In his adjustment cost model, a 
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homogeneous good (steel) is produced in both the United States and Japan using two 
factors of production. One factor, managers, is never laid off while the other (labor) may 
be laid off. Perhaps due to different social rules of layoffs, the adjustment cost, as 
reflected by the manager to labor ratio, is higher in Japan than that in the US. Both wages 
and security of employment enter workers' utility functions. Since employers offering 
secure jobs can pay lower wages and wages are fixed across the two states of the 
economy, therefore, it can be profit maximizing to retain factors of production in an 
economic downturn, even if the marginal product of a factor falls below the wage rate. 
The firm makes profits in the upturns and incurs losses in the downturns, assuming output 
is not storable. In this case, firms offering secure jobs may choose to sell below variable 
cost in cyclical downturns. Thus, Ethier shows that in the United States layoffs occur 
during the bad state of the economy, whereas in Japan workers are not laid oflF during 
similar periods and consequently produce more than their home market can absorb. To 
unload this over production, the Japanese firms dump in the United States at prices below 
their costs. 
Thus, Ethier shows that cost dumping is not irrational when factor market 
rigidities or transaction cost and output price uncertainty force a firm to choose a scale of 
production before it knows the market price. In such circumstances, a firm may have to 
sell the excess output at a price below cost. 
In an attempt to explain the observed stickiness of prices of traded goods in an 
export market in the face of exchange rate movements, Krugman (1989) demonstrates that 
sometimes it may be justified to sell below cost in an export market. Referring to the 
studies by Mann (1987) and Hooper and Mann (1987), Krugman shows that the margins 
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on certain imported goods in the importing country are significantly less than their 
counterparts in the exporting countries. 
In another example that compares Japanese unit labor cost with its manufactures 
export prices, both measured in U.S. dollars, Krugman shows that Japanese manufacturers 
have tried to stabilize their prices in export markets rather than allowing them to move in 
line with their costs. He also cites the example of the price of a Volvo car, imported fi-om 
Sweden, where unit labor cost, measured in U.S. dollars, rose by 70 per cent during 
1985-1987 while its price rose by only 17 percent during the same period. This 
demonstrates an unwillingness to alter export price when the exchange rate changes. 
Krugman (1989) presents one possible explanation of this phenomenon in terms of 
the "sunk cost model". The basic idea of the sunk cost model is that in the face of severe 
competition in the world market a firm that wants to export must invest substantial 
resources in adopting its product to the foreign market and develop a marketing and 
distribution network. These costs of entering a foreign market may be regarded as sunk 
once they have been incurred, i.e., a firm can not easily sell off its visible or invisible assets 
and recover the investment. Once these costs are incurred, a firm that has static 
expectations will be willing to stay in the market if it can only cover its variable costs due 
to exchange rate movements. So Krugman (1989) says, there is a "range of no change" 
for each firm, a range of exchange rate movement over which a firm will continue 
exporting if it is already doing so but will not be induced to begin exporting if it did not 
start out in that position. 
In another explanation, Krugman (1989) says, in reality firms do not have static 
expectations. He stresses that a firm's plans are based on expected exchange rates that lag 
the actual. Firms will not enter a market as soon as the returns at the current exchange 
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rate exceed the annualized value of sunk costs if they believe that the current favorable 
exchange rate is temporary; they will not exit a market, even when they can not cover 
variable costs, "if they view themselves as hanging onto a position that will in the not-too-
short future be profitable once again". 
Anderson's work (1990) also falls into the category of multiperiod analysis of 
dumping. He provides an inter-temporal linkage through sales in two periods. He shows 
that a perfectly competitive firm which maximizes profits over more than one period may 
have an incentive to sell below its marginal cost in an export market if there is a reasonable 
probability that this market is going to be constrmned in the fiature. This incentive is 
provided by the Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) allocation rule used by the importing 
country, which ties the assignment of the VER quotas to the previous sales or share of the 
market. 
If there is a positive probability of a fiiture VER, a perfectly competitive exporting 
firm has an incentive to dump in the current period in order to increase its sale or market 
share in the export market, thereby increasing its likelihood of getting an export license or 
a bigger quota under a VER. Anderson (1990) describes this as "current sales below cost 
buys options in the form of rights to license, with dumping acting like arbitrage to ensure 
that the value of the option equals its cost, the dumping margin". So, in this model a 
profit maximizing firm chooses a quantity such that the losses fi-om current period sales 
are balanced by the option of receiving export licenses in the case of a VER in the fiiture 
period. An interesting result which comes out of this paper is that a departure fi"om fi-ee 
trade leads to fiarther distortion of the trade, i.e., any exogenous shock which raises the 
probability of a fiiture VER results in increased dumping in the current period, and 
increase in total volume of import in a country in turn increases the probability of VER in 
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the future if the probability of future VER depends on current import volume. This is 
what Anderson calls "domino dumping". So, the inter temporal linkages provide a 
motivation for a competitive firm to dump in this model. 
It is commonly believed by the general public and also by politicians that dumping 
hurts the importing country. This has led to the demand for and the consequent enactment 
of the antidumping laws. In general, governments view antidumping laws as instruments 
that help restore free trade equilibrium, i.e., pre-dumping equilibrium. Governments also 
try to justify these antidumping laws by pointing out that since it has been agreed upon at 
all bilateral and multilateral forums that dumping is an "unfair" trade practice, therefore, 
any instrument to curb such practice is desirable. 
The original theoretical rationale for antidumping laws comes from Viner (1923). 
He argues that antidumping laws may be needed to protect domestic consumers from 
predatory dumping. The idea was that foreign firms may deliberately set prices low 
enough to drive existing domestic firms out of business and establish a monopoly and, 
later on, as a monopolist it can more than recoup its losses by exploiting its market power. 
Viner describes three major forms of dumping: short run, sporadic, and long run. Among 
the three, only the second type of dumping justifies reaction in his view, as only this form 
of dumping can be labeled as anti-competitive. Domestic firms should be able to adjust to 
the first form, and the gains to the consumers outweigh the losses to the domestic 
producers in the case of long run dumping. 
It is observed by many (in the U.S., EC and also in other countries) that 
antidumping laws are becoming a very attractive route for firms to obtain relief fi"om 
foreign competition as safeguard laws are not very easily accessible. Although there is an 
extra burden of proof associated with antidumping procedures, the injuiy requirements 
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under antidumping laws are easier to satisfy than those under safeguard procedures. The 
safeguard procedures require "serious injury" where as simple "material injury" is enough 
to invoke antidumping laws Serious injury is a much more stringent criterion than 
material injury. In most countries safeguard procedures also require policy makers to take 
into account the economy wide effect of any protective action and relief from such 
protection is limited in duration. 
Like many other policies, antidumping laws are abused. It has been observed by 
many that domestic firms often clamor for invoking the antidumping laws just because 
foreign firms are selling at prices that are lower than theirs. The complexity of the 
antidumping legislation and procedures have created an environment where the 
investigators tend to show that dumping is occurring even in cases where foreign and 
domestic prices are identical. In other instances, political considerations seem to compel 
the investigating agencies to try to maximize the probability of an affirmative finding in an 
antidumping caseHandley (1988, 1989) outlined such situations where EC 
investigation procedures appear to be biased in term of finding dumping. 
It has been mentioned earlier that governments react to dumping by imposing 
tariffs and justify these actions on the grounds of restoring free trade equilibrium. It can 
be argued that these antidumping laws are inferior instruments to remedy unfair trade 
practices because they do not address the sources of the problem, which in case of 
dumping are the barriers that segment the markets. Dixit (as Dixit (1988) discussed 
''According to Finger(1991) from 1975 to 1979, the U.S. government processed 245 antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases or some 50 cases per year, in the 1980s, the case load rose even higher, to 774 
cases between 1980 and 1988, or 86 cases a year. By comparison, there have been only four escape-clause 
cases a year, cases in which an industry saught protection from import competition without accusing the 
foreign seller of employing or benefiting from unfair practices. 
^Finger(1991) says, "The U.S. government almost always finds that the foreign exporter is unfair or is 
benefiting from the unfair actions of its government. Only 11 percent of dumping and subsidy 
determinations result in negedve determinations. 
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earlier) also finds no justification for reacting against dumping by imposing tariflf. On the 
contrary he shows that decreasing tariff can be welfare maximizing for a country in case of 
dumping by an exporter. But antidumping tariff has no correspondence to the dumping 
margin in Dixit model. 
Because of the ease with which antidumping laws are being used these days in 
different countries, the laws themselves are becoming constraints in firms' decision 
making. The mere presence and potential threat of antidumping laws affect the behavior 
of both importing as well as exporting firms. The threat of antidumping actions can lead 
domestic and exporting firms to alter the scale and production decisions. Staiger and 
Wolak(1992) show how a threat of filing an antidumping suit leads an exporting firm to 
adjust its capacity and allocation of that capacity between domestic and foreign markets. 
Staiger and Wolak set up a model in which the domestic industry is competitive whereas 
the foreign exporters are cartelized. The foreign monopolist can sell in both foreign as 
well as in the domestic markets while the domestic firms can only sell in the domestic 
market since they are denied access to the foreign market through highly protective 
barriers. The domestic demand is deterministic ( D = a - P) whereas the demand in the 
foreign market is stochastic (£)*=«*- P*). All variables with asterisks are associated 
with the foreign country, e.g., D* denotes the foreign demand, P* is the price in the 
foreign market,  and a* is  i . i .d random variable with the distr ibution function F{a*) 
which has fiill support on the interval [q* ,a*]. All variables without asterisks denote 
identical functions for the domestic market with an exception that a is deterministic. The 
technology is such that all domestic firms have identical constant long run marginal cost 
before the capacity is installed and constant short run marginal cost after the capacity is 
installed. The authors assume zero short run marginal costs in both countries for analysis 
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throughout the paper. They analyze the decision making of the firms (both domestic and 
foreign) in different trading environments. In the first case no antidumping law exists in 
the domestic country, in the second scenario domestic firms have access to antidumping 
laws, and in the third case tacit collusion among domestic and foreign firms is explored in 
the presence of antidumping laws. 
In all the cases decisions are made sequentially. First the foreign firm chooses the 
capacity (J^*) at r* per unit cost before the demand in the foreign market is revealed. 
After the foreign demand is realized, the monopolist sets the price P*and at this price 
quantity q* is sold in the foreign market such that: 
q\a\P\K*) = min[/s:*,D*(a*.^*)] 
The export level (x*) is than automatically determined as the residual of the foreign 
capacity {K*) and the sales {q'):  
x\a,P\K*) = K'-q\a,P ' X )  
Then the domestic firms take the foreign export capacity x* as given and act like followers 
in the Stackelberg leadership model and choose a capacity ^at a per unit cost of r. It is 
also assumed that the domestic long run marginal cost lies between the foreign long run 
and short run marginal costs which implies: 
r* >r >0 
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In the last stage foreign and domestic firms pick a price simuhaneously in the domestic 
market. It is demonstrated, in the case of no antidumping laws, that all firms will choose 
a price P such that P = r under certain plausible conditions. One of these conditions is 
that the domestic demand at this price is greater than the export capacity D(P) >x\ 
therefore, the residual demand for the domestic firms is positive at this price. The 
domestic capacity is then, K{x*) = D{P) -  x*. The authors show at this point that there 
exist a unique equilibrium at the price P , i.e., no firm has any incentive to pick a price 
other than P since all the firms are able to dispose of entire capacity at this price. The 
condition of zero economic profits for the domestic firms is also satisfied at this price. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, the domestic industry chooses a capacity K(x*) . The optimal 
capacity for the foreign firm is determined through maximization of its expected profits 
E7r*(K*). There is range of foreign demand [a' <a* < a* ] over which the foreign 
capacity becomes binding for the foreign market sales. This means that the foreign firm 
exports only if the realized foreign demand is smaller than a*. The foreign market sales 
are represented by the following expression: 
The expected profits of the monopolist can, therefore, be written as follows : 
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E7t\K*) = JP\a X) .K*dF{a) 
a 
+  J  . x \ a X )]dF{ a ) -  r*K* 
Maximization of the above expected profit function over K* yields a unique 
capacity choice for the foreign monopolist. During the periods when the foreign 
demand is suflSciently high, i.e. a* > a'(Kg), the monopolist only sells in the foreign 
market. But during the times when the foreign demand is low (a* < a*(^ro))the 
monopolist sells D*{a*,P'{a')) at price P* in the foreign market and the excess is sold in 
the domestic market at a price P < P*. The price charged by the monopolist in the 
domestic market (P) is less than what it charges in the foreign market (P*) and at this 
domestic price the monopolist is only able to cover its short run marginal cost but not its 
long run marginal cost. This means that it is engaged in dumping. 
In the second case presence of antidumping laws in the domestic country affects 
the behavior of both domestic and foreign firms. In this environment where the domestic 
industry has access to antidumping laws, it compares the cost and benefits of bringing an , 
antidumping suit against the foreign exporting firm.. The total cost to the domestic firms 
of filing an antidumping case is FK. And the benefit is the change in the profits of the 
domestic firms. 
A;r(x\K,F)= [P(K)- F- P{K+ x')]K= (x*- F)K. 
Therefore, the domestic industry will file an antidumping suit if and only if 
A7r{x',K,F) > 0. This implies that an antidumping case will be filed against the foreign 
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firm if the exports reach or exceed a critical level x* such that x'  > F = x' .  It is 
assumed here that a successful antidumping suit against the foreign monopolist precludes 
the firm from exporting any quantity. Therefore, the threat of an antidumping suit affects 
the foreign monopolist's choice of capacity in the first place. Since the export capacity 
depends on the foreign capacity {K*) and the realization of the foreign demand (a'), there 
is a range a* e [a*,a* ] where there are no exports by the foreign firm, but when a* 
takes the value a\ , exports reach the critical level x*. In the range a* e ,a*], 
foreign exports are positive but not enough to invoke an antidumping suit against the 
foreign exporter. But for a*<al,the domestic industry files an antidumping suit and 
then there are no exports by the foreign firm. In this case the foreign monopolist either 
lowers the foreign price to P*(a*; AT*) so that the sales increase in the foreign country 
and the exports are kept under x* level in order to avoid the antidumping suit, or as the 
second option, the foreign monopolist sets the unconstrained monopoly price P*(a*) in 
the foreign market and faces an antidumping suit. Thus, they end up selling nothing in the 
foreign market. Under the above specifications, the revenue of the foreign firm, 
R*(a* ;K*), can be written as follows: 
R \ a X )  =  
P\aX).K\ 
P\a).D\a ,P\a))+P.x\a X),  for a* e  
P\a -,K').D\a -,P\a X)) + ^  x\ for a* g 
P\a).D\a*-P\a)),  
for a* e ], 
f    [a*2{K*),a*X)\ 
for  e  [alX),alX)l  
In the presence of antidumping laws, the expected profits of the foreign monopolist 
becomes; 
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En\K*)= \R\aX)dF{a)-r*K* 
a  
Maximization of this expected profit fianction over the choice variable K* and then solving 
the first order conditions give a different capacity choice (^*) for the foreign monopolist 
in the presence of antidumping laws in the domestic (importing) country. The capacity 
choices made by the foreign firm in the presence and in the absence of domestic 
antidumping laws are then compared by evaluating the first order conditions of expected 
profit maximization in the case when there are no antidumping laws, at the optimal 
capacity choice made in the presence of antidumping laws. It is demonstrated that 
Kl< Kl, which means that the optimal capacity reduces for the foreign firm in the 
presence of antidumping laws in the domestic country and so does the a\, i.e. now 
Now, in the same environment, the effects of a tacit collusion among the domestic 
industry and the foreign monopolist are studied. Obviously, such a collusion can only be 
sustained if the gains fi'om adhering to the agreement to each concerned party outweigh 
the losses from breaking this self-enforcing agreement. It implies that the domestic firms 
can not have a one-time gain fi-om breaking the agreement because perfect competition in 
the domestic market means that all domestic firms will have zero economic profit in 
equilibrium. So the incentive for the domestic industry to adhere to the agreement requires 
the foreign firm to keep its exports below x level. The foreign monopolist gains fi-om 
the agreement only when the foreign demand is sufficiently low, i.e. a* <al and thus, the 
exports exceed the x* level. The present discounted value of cooperative agreement to 
the foreign monopolist  is  denoted hy co*. The monopolist  sets the price P'(a*;K' ,(a')  
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in the foreign market and export no more than ** in order to avoid an antidumping suit. 
Its revenues are then : 
R\a-,K\a)=P\cc'X,a) ') .D\a-,P\a-,K\ai '))+Px 
As an other alternative it sets the unconstrained monopoly price P*(a*) and faces an 
antidumping suit, in this case its revenues are : 
R\a)=P*(a).D\a';P\a*)) 
The foreign monopolist has to choose between these two alternatives and the authors 
show that  since the cooperative equil ibrium can be sustained with price P*{a*\K',o) ')  
over a certain range of a', therefore, the monopolist pursues the suit avoidance policy 
and limits the exports under x* level without changing the monopoly price in the foreign 
market. Given a level of capacity in the foreign country, this policy then, results in some 
of the capacity being unused and in order to sustain the cooperation the foreign 
monopolist has to abstain from using this unused capacity. The expected profits of the 
monopolist under cooperation are then as follows : 
a* 
a' 
The first order condition from the optimization of the above cooperative expected profit 
function implicitly defines the foreign capacity choice as a fiinction of a*in equilibrium. 
It is demonstrated, then, for gj*> 0, the optimal capacity choice under self-
enforced-cooperative agreement (K^Cco')) is such that: Kg >Kl{(o')>K'. 
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Staiger and Wolak demonstrate that the optimal decisions of the firms are affected 
by the presence of antidumping laws in the importing country. They show that the foreign 
monopolist's optimal capacity level reduces when the domestic country has antidumping 
laws, even during the periods when the domestic firms do not file any antidumping suit 
against the exporter. As a resuh the trade volume (in this case exports) also reduces in the 
presence and/or threat of antidumping laws. The capacity choice and thereby the trade 
volume is also affected by the possibility of a tacit collusion between the foreign and 
domestic firms. Although the capacity, in this case, is still smaller as compared to the one 
in absence of antidumping laws, but greater than the one when there was no possibility of 
cooperation among the foreign and domestic firms in the face of antidumping laws in the 
importing country. 
The problem with Staiger and Wolak model is that it is not very interesting in a sense 
that there is no political motivation for invoking the antidumping laws in this model. Even 
if dumping takes place, no one hurts in this model because the domestic market is assumed 
to be perfectly competitive and no producer surplus is lost in the domestic country when 
the foreign firm sells its output in the domestic market. 
As the resuhs fi"om the standard international trade theory ® show that trade 
protection generally increases the welfare of the protected industry, primarily the 
antidumping laws are aimed at protecting the welfare of domestic producers, although 
predation is usually mentioned as one rationale for having the antidumping laws. 
Our objective is to fiirther analyze the effects of antidumping laws. We will set 
up a simple partial equilibrium duopoly model, similar to the one by Brander and Spencer, 
® The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem says that, in a two-country framework, trade protection which raises 
the price of an importable good unambiguously increases the real returns to the fector intensively used in 
production of that good. 
31 
and examine the effect of antidumping laws or even the presence of antidumping on firms' 
decision making. For the simplicity we will restrict the analysis in our model to one way 
trade. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODEL 
In order to analyze the firms' behavior in the presence of antidumping laws, we will 
use a simple deterministic duopoly model, which is unlike the one by Staiger and Wolak 
since that model can not capture the fiill effects of antidumping law due to the presence of 
competitive a market in the home country. In our duopoly model, two almost identical 
firms are located in two distinct countries; home country (H) and a foreign country (F), 
and produce an identical product which is sold in both countries. As in Staiger and 
Wolak, only one way trade is allowed in this model, one reason for that could be that the 
foreign country has very strict trade restrictions which prohibit any imports in the country 
F, whereas the home country does not have any such restrictions on imports. Therefore, 
the firm located in the home country can not sell in the foreign country but the foreign 
firm, which is a monopolist in its own country, competes with the home firm in the home 
country. Although there is a transportation cost (t) for shipping a unit of the good firom 
one country to another, the foreign firm is assumed to produce in only one (the foreign) 
country due to the large fixed cost associated with installing a new plant at a different 
place. 
We assume linear demand fiinctions for this product in the two countries which 
look as follows: 
Demand in the home country is 
P, = A-l3iY, + X,) (3.1) 
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and demand in the foreign country is 
P f  = a - f i [ X j - ) .  (3.2) 
As mentioned, the foreign firm is a monopolist in the foreign market and plays 
Nash duopoly game in the home market with the home firm. We set up the model in such 
a way that both firms make decisions in two stages. 
Stage I 
In the first stage both firms choose their capacity levels simultaneously. The home 
firm chooses its capacity (7,) at a capacity or fixed cost rj[Y^) and the foreign firm also 
chooses its capacity level (^,) at a fixed or capacity cost 
Stage II 
In the second stage both firms simultaneously choose their sales for the home and 
the foreign market. The home firm only has to choose its sales in the home market 
s.iYf, <Y^ . The foreign firm also chooses its sales for the home market and for the 
foreign market such that the total sale in both markets do not exceed the capacity chosen 
at the stage I, i.e., Xy^,Xf ^ X^-ir Xj- < X, . The Game Tree (Figure I) shows this 
decision process by both firms. 
We will analyze firms' behavior in two scenarios: 
i. The first situation is when there are no antidumping laws present in any country. 
Hereafter we will refer to this as the unconstrained case. In this case the foreign 
firm acts as monopolist in the foreign country because the foreign 
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Figure I: Game Tree 
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country has a prohibitive tariff which does not allow the home firm to sell in the 
foreign market. In the home country where the foreign firm competes with the 
home firm, they play a Nash duopoly game. 
ii. The second case is where the antidumping law comes into effect in the home 
country and imposes a constraint on the foreign firm. According to the US, as well 
as GATT antidumping codes, dumping is considered to have occurred if an 
exporter charged a price in an import market which was less than the price charged 
in the exporting country for the same good plus transportation costs. Therefore an 
antidumping tariff (r)is imposed on the imports if such a discrepancy in prices in 
the two markets is observed. The antidumping tariff (r)is some function of the 
dumping margin^ . 
The other studies which analyze firms' behavior in the presence of antidumping 
laws in the importing country are Gruenspecht(1988) and Staiger and Wolak(1992) and 
they treat antidumping tariffs as prohibitive. Gruenspecht, who uses the cost criterion for 
the assessment of dumping, finds it profitable for a firm to sell below its current marginal 
cost and therefore dump in order to take advantage of lower costs in the next period due 
to learning effect. In this setting he demonstrates an equilibrium in mixed strategy where 
in certain cases, due to the presence of anti dumping law in the home country, the foreign 
exporter is totally shut out of the home market. Similarly Staiger and Wolak also prohibit 
the foreign firm from selling anything in the home market in the wake of a successfiil 
antidumping suit against it. However, antidumping tariffs are not automatically 
^The US Commerce Department calculates the dumping margin by comparing each sale in the United 
States by the foreign firm to a single weighted average exporting country price or a single "constructed 
value" (including all costs plus a statutory 8% profit). Because there is no uncertain^ in our model, sales 
below casts will not occur. Therefore, we ignore the issue of "injury" in deciding when dumping laws are 
invoked. 
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prohibitive, but depend on the margin, and thus successful antidumping cases do not 
entirely eliminate the imports from a firm which was the target of an antidumping suit. We 
will try to show this by demonstrating that it may be optimal, in certain situations, for a 
firm to dump in the presence of antidumping laws and pay the antidumping penalties^. 
The duopoly setting makes the dynamics more interesting because the presence of 
the antidumping law in the home country gives a first play advantage to the domestic firm. 
The sales of the foreign firm in the home market are now a fiinction of the home firm 
sales. Since the price in the home market depends both on the home firm's sale as well as 
sales of the foreign firm in the home market, therefore, the home firm may flood the home 
market with its output. This results in a price so low that if the foreign firm sells anything 
in the home market it would be subject to an antidumping suit and would be paying 
penalties. We will analyze both home and foreign firm behavior in this context. 
Antidumping Tariff Rule 
The tariff rule under antidumping law is not like other import tariffs which are 
exogenously determined prior to the exporting firm's output and export decisions and 
levied on all levels of imports. The antidumping tariff only kicks in when the price in an 
import market is less than the price in the exporting country plus transportation cost. 
Thus the antidumping tariff is not differentiable over the entire range of the exporting 
firm's sales in the import market. The antidumping tariff rule (r) that we are going to use 
is as follows: 
2 One respect in which the antidumping tariff is different than other import tariffs is that once imposed, 
the antidumping tariff is usually permanent. 
where (3.3) 
37 
5 = 
e if {Pf+t)>P, ^ 
0 if (Pr+t)<P, 
(3.4) 
This implies that at a given level of home firm's sales (7^) and the foreign firm's 
sales in the foreign market ) '• 
3 X,s. t .X,<X, S = Q &. r = 0 and 
(3.5) 
d=s & T >0 
So this type of antidumping rule will effect the optimal response of each firm to its rival's 
changes in the sales in the import market. 
The presence of such antidumping law causes non concavity in the home firm's 
profit fiinction which later results in discontinuities in the home firm's stage I reaction 
function. Obviously if the Nash equilibrium resuhs in dumping, enactment of antidumping 
laws would affect this equilibrium. An interesting situation to be analyzed is the one when 
the Nash equilibrium, in the absence of antidumping laws in the home country, does not 
result in dumping, i.e., Pj-+t>P^ in equilibrium. We shall show that like 
Gruenspecht(1988), the introduction of antidumping laws may aflfect even this equilibrium. 
Unlike Gruenspecht, we show muhiple local equilibrium may occur. 
We also assume that both firms produce at constant marginal cost. Therefore, 
under the above specified conditions, the profit functions for the two firms look as 
follows: 
The home firm's profit functions 
^The law usually recommend antidumping tariff equivalent to the dumping margin, i.e., typically 5=1 but 
we allow e to take any value to investigate welfare implications of the "optimal" rule. 
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J f . + n ) = - c ( n ) - > K i ^ )  
and the foreign firms profit fiinction is 
K, = [A-M.K+X,)}X, +{a-fiX,)X,-[C{X, + X^)+Tj(X,)] 
where the variables with subscript (h ) are associated with the home market, and the 
variables with subscript ( f) are associated with the foreign market. All the variables are 
defined below. 
Variables 
Profit of the home firm. 
TV J- Profit of the foreign firm.. 
Pft Price in the home market. 
Pf Price in the foreign market. 
Foreign firm's sales in the home market. 
XJ- Foreign firm's sales in the foreign market. 
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Home firm's sales in the home market. 
X, Foreign firm' s capacity. 
y, Home firm's capacity. 
C Foreign firm's cost function. 
C Home firm's cost function (C and C are scalers here). 
77(Y, ) Home firm's fixed or capacity cost. 
"^(Xj) Foreign firm's fixed or capacity cost. 
t Per unit transportation cost. 
T Antidumping tariff. 
Solution Strategy 
The solution for this type of two-stage games is obtained by solving backward; we 
assume a subgame perfect Nash solution. Given X, and Y„ we find the Nash solution for 
stage II; then, given these rules, the stage I solutions are found. Therefore, for our model, 
first the home firm and the foreign firm optimize their objective fianctions over sales in the 
home and foreign, resulting in the following. 
Y^{Yt,X,, parameters of the model) 
{Y,, X,, parameters of the model) 
Xj^ (Y,,X,, parameters of the model) 
(3.8) 
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After this we solve for the Stage I problem of both firms, which means that the home firm 
and the foreign firm maximize their respective profits with respect to and Z, and find: 
By substituting Y^,X^, andXf into the above we get the following reaction fiinctions for 
the home and the foreign firm, respectively. 
Y.iX.,  parameters of the model) 
, , (3.10) 
X, (7,, parameters of the model) 
And when we solve these two best response fiinctions simultaneously, we get the Nash 
equilibrium solution for our model. 
Yt( parameters of the model) 
(3.11) 
Xt ( parameters of the model) 
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CHAPTER IV 
NO-DUMPING-PENALTY CASE 
We use the best response function (reaction function ) approach to find the 
solution to this model. As we have discussed earlier, we would carry out the analysis 
under two general scenarios 
( i )  W h e n  t h e r e  a r e  n o  a n t i d u m p i n g  l a w s  i n  t h e  h o m e  c o u n t r y  o r  w h e n  
dumping is not penalized. 
(ii) When the antidumping laws are enforced in the home country and 
the antidumping tariff, which is some proportion of the dumping 
margin, is imposed on the dumped imports. 
In this chapter we will take up the former case and derive the best response 
functions for both home and foreign firms. We will then characterize the solution of the 
model under the assumption that the foreign firm does not face any penalty in the situation 
where the home market price less the transportation cost turns out to be less than the price 
of the same good in the foreign market. 
The antidumping tariff rate, as defined in chapter 3, is equal to some proportion 
of the dumping margin J. The tariff rule is given below. 
where (4.1) 
6 = 
s if [P^+t)>P^ 
0 if 
(4.2) 
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When expressed in terms of the linear demand functions specified earlier for the home and 
foreign countries = A-/3{X^ +]^)and = a-pXj-, respectively, the dumping 
margin is: 
[(iV+!)-?,]= a-^,--4+;eHf.+^.+( (4.3) 
[(P,+i)-P,] = l l(X,-X,)-Z where (4.4) 
Z  =  Y - c t  and 
Y  =  A - 1 -  p Y f , .  Therefore, 
r = s{^X,-Xj)-z} (4.5) 
The value of 5, which represents the extent of the penalty imposed on the 
dumping firm, is decided by the Conmierce Department and can range between 0 and oo. 
The only two previous studies, Gruenspecht(1988) and Staiger and Wolak(1992), which 
tried to analyze the effects of antidumping law, have treated the value of 6 as given at oo 
That essentially meant eliminating all the imports after a successful antidumping case 
against the foreign supplier, which may not be the case in reality. A paper by Reitzes in 
the November 1993 issue of International Economic review uses a model that is very 
much like ours.i 
' Reitzes's paper appeared after our work was completed. 
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In this section we will analyze the situation when there is no antidumping law 
present in any country or no antidumping tariff is imposed, which implies the value of 5 = 
0. The foreign country, however, still has trade barriers which do not allow the home firm 
to sell its product in the foreign country. On the other hand the foreign firm can sell in 
both foreign and home country. We follow the solution strategy described in the earlier 
section, i.e. solving the Stage II of the game first and the Stage I second. Given the linear 
demand fianctions = A- /3{Yf, + X;,) and /y = a- in the home and the foreign 
country, respectively, the profit fianctions of the two firms are given below. 
Home firm's profit fijnction: 
=  [ A - P ( Y ,  + X.)}r. -Cft)- (4.6) 
Foreign firm's profit fiinction: 
-[c(X. +X,)+t{X,)  + Tj{X,]] (4,7) 
All the variables are the same as defined in the earlier section. 
Stage n Problem 
Given the capacity levels of the foreign and the home firms, X ,  and Y , ,  the second 
stage problem of the home firm is choosing the home sales such that Y^<Yj.. But we 
will restrict our attention to the domain in which the capacity chosen in the first stage is 
binding in the decision making at the second stage of the game. Therefore, the home 
firm's objective Sanction is as follows. 
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MAXL,=[A-l3(Y,+X,)]Y,-C(Y,)-7ir,)  + Mr,-r,)  (4.8) 
First order conditions are; 
^ = A-2pY^ -ySY, -C- A <0 (4.9) 
— = y,-Y,>Q (4.10) 
Since we assumed that the sale of both firms in stage II are constrained by the 
capacities chosen earlier, therefore, A, > 0 and equation (4.10) implies that Y^=Y,, i.e., the 
home firm will sell everything in the home market that it produces in the first stage. From 
equation (4.9), we get the value of X. 
For the foreign firm the second stage problem is: given the home firm's sales, Y^, 
{Y^ will be equal to Y„)'^ it has to choose the levels of sales both in the home market 
(X^) and in the foreign market (A'y)such that the sales in the two markets do not exceed 
its capacity level chosen in stage I. Since at this stage we assumed that there is no penalty 
for dumping in the home country, the foreign firm is not bound by this constraint. Thus 
the foreign firm's objective fiinction becomes: 
^With capacities chosen simultaneously by both firms in stage I, and no imcertainty in the model, neither 
firm will find it optimal to choose a non-binding level of capacity in that stage. 
X = A-2fiY^-/3X,-C>0 (4.11) 
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^  L, ={A- f l ( r ,+X,)}X,  +{a- f iX , )X, -C{X,+X^)  
, (4.12) 
- i (x , ) -T j{x , ) - i -e{ x , -x , -x , )  
Following are the first order conditions. 
—~ = a-2/3Xj . -C -6<0 (4.13) 
J-
^=A-2px , -pY , - c - t -e< 0  (4.14) 
dLf  ^
 = X , - X . - X , > 0  ( 4 . 1 5 )  
de  
We assume an interior solution whereA';, ,Xf>Q and also that the firm does not choose 
a capacity in the stage I which it can not sell later in the second stage of decision making, 
i.e., 6>0. Thus the inequalities of the preceding first order conditions become strict 
equalities. After defining the following variables. 
Y -  A-1-  pY^ and Z = y  -a ,  the above first order conditions can be reduced to the 
following; 
Z- ipXt ,+2pXf=Q 
X, -X,=Q 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
We get the solution for X^ and Xf by using Cramer's Rule: 
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"-1 r [%1 
_ 1 1 
. . 
-1 '1  - r  \'M 
~ 2 -1 -1 
.  X , .  
^  Z X,  X;.=—+ — (4.18)  
"  Ap 2  
(419)3 IP 
2 4/? 
(p^+/) -P,=y0(^, -X^)-Z =  ^ |  OasZ|  0  (4 .20)  
By adding equation (4.13) and equation (4.14), we get the 0 as follows: 
0 = -/?(X, + JT/) - C > 0 (4.21) 
And from equation (4.10), we get; 
r, = Y, (4.22) 
^These solutions of Xj, and Xf are valid, provided: 
4/3 Otherwise 
Z>0,  £L<i_  
2 4^ 
Z<0,  ^<  — 2 4/? 
j^ r^=o,x ,=x,  
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At this stage some variables are fiirther regrouped for simplicity. Let L be the 
value of the first unit sale of the product to the home firm; that is the difference between 
the intercept of the home country's demand fiinction (^4) and the intercept of the home 
firm's marginal cost (C + 77), all divided by the slope of the demand fiinction [0) i.e., 
,  A-{C + ri )  
L  = (4.23) 
Likewise, let K be the value of the first unit of sale of the product to the foreign firm, that 
is the difference between the intercept of the foreign country's demand function (a) and 
the intercept of the foreign firm's marginal cost (C + 7), all divided by the slope of the 
foreign country's demand function [0), i.e., 
a - (C + 7) 
K = i ( 4 . 2 4 )  
Define: 
Y" = A-a- t  
.  P .  
(4.25) 
Now X ^ , X j - ,  and 0  can be rewritten as; 
(4.26) 
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2 4 
a-C Y ' -Y ,  
- X .  > 0  
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
Here note: 
{Pf* i -p . )=My,-y)^  0 as 1^1 r (4.29) 
i.e., that dumping occurs when K > . This gives us one bound on X,  as shown below. 
(4.30) 
,  ,  a -C 
where k  = (4.31) 
Stage I 
Now the stage I problem for both firms is to choose their capacity levels given the 
second stage choices of the home and foreign market sales, 
Y ^ { X , , y,),X ^ { X i , 7,),andX j- { X , , Y , ) . ¥ O T  the foreign firm it has to choose X ,  , given the 
follovwng profit function. 
i f {x , . r , )={p , - i -qx , (x , .K)+{p, -C)x ,{x„r , )  
(4.32) 
- •n{x , )*^x , -x , (x , . r , ) -x , {x„r , )]  
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The above profit function when maximized with respect to X,, gives: 
aK  ^
\  r 
+ 
dn f 8K f 
^  X ^  
dXf  cX,  
\ 
dn f dQ 
ae ax, 
\  f 
+ 
\ 
f  * ^ 
H-
an f 
ax  ^
\ y 
(4.33) 
Since we assumed the existence of an interior solution where the foreign firm sells in both 
home and foreign markets {X^,Xj- >0), the first three terms in the above expression 
(4.33) vanish by the complementary slackness condition. Since 7^ = Y„ therefore the fourth 
SY 
term is also equal to zero, —= 0. Thus, the expression reduces to the following. 
aX, 
S K f  _  
^  = 0 -  7 7  =  0  ( 4 . 3 4 )  
5X, 
From equiation (4.21), we substitute the value of 6 into the equation (4.34) and get: 
6 = f i  " -C. I l zL .y  -T]=0 (4 .35)  
2 
and the following best response function for the foreign firm is obtained"*. 
Y" -Y 
X , = K  +  -  ^ (4.36) 
''This reaction function is valid if we have an interior solution. 
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The home firm also has to choose its capacity level Yf at the first stage, given the 
second stage home and foreign market sales choices Y^{X,,Y,),Xf,{X,,Y,), and 
Xj.{X,,Y^). Now the home firm's profit fiinction is: 
^ ,{r , .x , )={p , -c)Z{r„x , ) - i i r , )+x[r , -Y ,[r , .  x , ) ]  (4 .3?)  
And the optimal choice for the capacity (Y() is made as follows: 
• •  <^h 
+ 
dX 
X 
dX dY, 
\ 
cY. 
dX. 
\  f * \  
+ 
y dX, \ / 
= 0 (4.38) 
The envelope theorem ensures that the first two terms in the above expression vanish. 
The third term has three components and one of them represent response of the foreign 
firm in the home market to the change in the home firm's sale in that market. All the 
components of the third term can be obtained fi"om the equations (4.6), (4.18), and (4.22), as 
given below: 
(4.39) 
5Y, 4 
(4.40) 
5Y, 
= 1 (4.41) 
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Equation (4.38) becomes 
571,  _pY,  
SV, 4 
+  1-77  =  0  (4.42) 
We substitute X and Y, from equations (4.11) and (4.22) respectively, into the (4.42) and get: 
f i r .  
+  A-2/3Y, -pX, -{C + r})  =  0  (4.43) 
or 
P 4 t h  
= O (4.44) 
After making a substitution for and rearranging the terms we get the best response 
function for the home firm. 
( Y'' X, 3 \ 
L-i L_i .y  
4 2 2 ' 
= 0 (4.45) 
V 
or 
AL-2X,  -Y ' '  
r 
(4.46) 
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When we solve these stage I best response functions for the foreign and home 
firms simultaneously, we find the following Nash solution to this unconstrained game^. 
12K-4L + 7Y '  
= — ro—  
and 
AL-IK-IY"  
Y, = (4.48) 
Figure II is the graphical representation of the unconstrained stage I best response 
functions of the home and foreign firm and the Nash solution of the unconstrained game. 
We substitute the Nash solution back into the stage II choice variables, Yf,[X^, Y,), 
X^{X,,Y,), and Xj.{X,,Y,), and find their reduced forms. 
ri.=i=-^[{A + l)+{C + 7i)-2{C + ri)] (4.49) 
Similarly, we get Xh and X/hy  substituting Y,'^ and X^ into equation (4.18) and (4.19), 
respectively. 
5we can solve these equations by substitution or by the Cranuner's Rule. 
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K 
X, = K +  
N 
yc  
2 L -  —  
yc 
K+— 
N 
Figure EE: The Unconstrained Nash Equilibrium 
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* IK + IY ' -^L  (4.50)6 
(4.51)7 
Lets examine whether or not dumping takes place at stage II in this unconstrained 
Nash equilibrium (absent antidumping laws). According to our definition, which is 
consistent with the one used in the US., EEC., and other industrialized countries, dumping 
is considered to have taken place if the price in the import market is less than the price 
charged for the same product in the exporting country plus the transportation cost, i.e., if 
Ph < . Thus, if P^ - (Py + /) > 0, there is no dumping. With our linear demand 
functions, the dumping margin can be represented as: 
A = \P , - (P ,  +<)] = [^ - P X , -{a- p x ,  + / ) ]  (4.52) 
^The equation (4.18) gives: 
_1_ ^A+5a-l t  2(C + ?)-6(C +7) 
"^2  Sp 
^The equation (4.19) gives: 
Xf=-\ A-a-t^  ^ 1 2(^+f)+2(C +r})-4{C + r])  
4j5 j 4 SyS 
1 3A+5a-7t  2(C +77)-6(0 + 77) 
"^2 Wp SP 
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^  = z+p(x^-x , )  (4.53) 
and if the foreign firm acts as a profit maximizer then it equates its marginal revenue in the 
foreign market to its marginal revenue in the home market (Mi?;.), i.e.. 
P,- t -pX, -P^+pXf=Q,  (4.54) 
A-ipX^-pYf ,  - t -a^2pXj-=0 ,  (4.55) 
f i [ x , - x , )  =  - - (4.56) 
By substituting (4.56) into (4.53), the dumping margin for this model is: 
2 
(4.57) 
Z  =  A - a - t - P Y f ,  and by substituting 7a in the above, we get: 
z  =  p  A-cc- t  (^L- lK- i r )  (4.58) 
Z^-^AL-IK-IY ']  (4.59) 
56 
Let J  = [4Z, So if J> 0, dumping takes place and when J< 0 no dumping 
occurs. If J>0,  the unconstrained Nash equilibrium will result in dumping and if the 
antidumping law comes into effect at this stage, this equilibrium will change. 
This critical value ( 7" ) of the home firm's capacity divides the whole space into 
two regions see Figure III. In the region where Y^=Y, <¥", no dumping takes place, 
i.e., the optimal sales by the foreign firm in the home country will keep price in the foreign 
market lower than the price in the home market. In the region where 7^ = > 7", the 
price discrimination rule by the foreign firm will not work and if the foreign firm tries to 
sell in the home market, dumping occurs and it may find itself subject to antidumping 
action by the home country. 
* 
Even if J < 0 , but Yt  is very close to the Y" in the unconstrained Nash equilibrium, the 
enactment or presence of antidumping laws may still affect this equilibrium. In the 
following chapters we will explore the parameter spaces in some of which dumping will 
take place and antidumping law may mater, and in some parameter spaces dumping does 
not occur and, therefore, antidumping laws may not mater. 
Let's examine again what J>0 mean. 
y = 4I-2A:-77' =4 
-2 
a-[C + 77) 
- 7  
A-a- t  L P \ L P \ L p J 
J  = 5a- ' iA  + l t  + 2(C + //) - 4(C + 77) 1 (4.61) 
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r, 
A 
J > 0 {Dumpin g) 
J < 0 [ N o  D u m p i n  g) 
Figure ni: Dumping and no Dumping Regions 
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If both foreign and home markets are similar in size, i.e., A = a  and both firms have 
identical cost structures, i.e., (C + 77) = (C + ^ ), then equation (4.61) implies that dumping 
takes place (J>0)  because a -  (C_ t j ) )>0.  On the other hand dumping may not 
automatically resuh if: 
i) the home country is very large compared to the foreign country, e.g. USA being home 
and Taiwan being the foreign country, and therefore demand is higher in the home country 
(here  i t  means  A»a) .  
ii) the home firm is more efficient than the foreign firm and can produce the product at 
lower  cos t  than  tha t  o f  the  fore ign  f i rm,  so  (C + t j )  >  (C +7}^  
iii) there is no or negligible transportation cost, i.e., t is small. 
Under the above conditions it is possible for J  to be negative and dumping may, 
thus not occur in equilibrium. 
59 
CHAPTER V 
FOREIGN FIRM AND ANTIDUMPING LAW 
In this chapter we look at the situation where antidumping laws are present and 
enforced in the home country. A special tariff is imposed on the foreign firm whenever it 
sells its product in the home country at a price that is less than the price it charges in its 
own country plus the transportation costs from the foreign country to the home country. 
These antidumping laws would affect the foreign firm's choices because now to 
maximize its profits, it can not exercise simple price discrimination in two countries 
without incorporating this constraint into its decision-making. In this situation the foreign 
firm essentially has two options. One is to choose its foreign and home market sales in 
such a way that dumping never occurs (i.e., foreign price plus transportation costs remain 
less than or equal to the price in the home market). The other option for the foreign firm 
is to continue to exercise price discrimination and dump in the home market and pay the 
antidumping tariff. 
In the following section we analyze conditions under which the foreign firm avoids 
dumping and allocates its sales in the home and foreign markets such that the difference 
between the prices in these two markets is less than the transportation costs, and those 
situations in which it finds optimal to dump ( exercise price discrimination). It is shown in 
the previous chapter that, if V, > V and there is no antidumping law, the foreign firm 
exercises price discrimination between the two markets and dumping occurs. In this 
chapter we set up the general problem for the foreign firm and analyze the above 
mentioned situations. 
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The antidumping tariff ( x), as we have defined earlier, is some proportion (6 ) of the 
dumping margin; 
r = J.max[(P^+/-P^),o]. (5.1) 
We have also discussed that neither firm finds it optimal to choose a capacity at stage I 
that would be non-binding later at stage II, therefore, X, = X^+ Xf and =Y,. Along 
with this when substitutions are made for 
Pf=a-pXf, (5.2) 
/', = ^-/?(X,+rJ,and (5.3) 
Z = A-a- t -Y^  (5.4) 
the tariff rule, as a function of the dumping margin, can be rewritten as below 
r = 5.max[/?(2X,-Z,)-Z;0]. (5.5) 
Now we define Xf, as the level of foreign sales in the home market such that prices in 
two countries are the same, thus the dumping margin is zero. 
i,: p{2X^-Xyz = Q (5.6) 
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(5.7) 
This implies that if the foreign firm's sales in the home country are less than dumping 
does not take place and vice versa, i.e.. 
If <X^ => No dumping. 
* 
If X^> X^ => Dumping. 
* 
This causes nondiflFerentiability in the foreign firm's profit fiinction at X^. 
Given X,  = X^+X^,  the foreign firm's profit function, as shown in the previous chapter, 
can be written as; 
After we substitute for the inverse demand functions and the antidumping tariff" rule, the 
foreign firm's profits are as follows. 
Given the above profit fiinction, the foreign firm chooses sales in the foreign and home 
markets at stage II and it chooses its capacity (Z,) at stage I. 
(5.8) 
7r^={/3X,  +Z-2PX,)X,  +{a-pX,  +PX,)X,  
-5 .mz^[p{2X,-X, ) -Z-0]X, - (C + r j )X,  (5.9) 
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Stage n 
At this stage, the foreign firm chooses its sales in the home country {Xy,) and its sales in 
the foreign market {X/) (obtained as = X,- Xf, ). Therefore, the foreign firm 
maximizes the above profit function over Xf,. Note, however, that there is a 
*  Z  X  
nondififerentiability in the foreign firm's profit fiinction at X,, = — + Thus, upon 
differentiating, we get the following derivatives: 
*  7  X  
^ = 2y9Z,+Z-4;a^,=0 for X,<X,=^ + ^  (5.10) 
^ = 2^,+Z-W.-4,S(4Z.-X,)-Z] = 0 for -f. >X. = (5.11) 
* « 
When the above first order condition is evaluated at X^ as approaches Xf, fr-om 
below (the left hand side derivative) and when X,, approaches Xf, from above (the right 
hand side derivative), we get the following expressions for the derivatives: 
~^ u 
dn  f  
= -z (5.12) 
di t ,  dn. 
=  - S f i X , - { l  +  S ) Z < - Z ,  S > 0 , x , > 0  (5.13) 
63 
We have already shown that if 7, < V (which implies that Z > 0), the presence of 
antidumping laws is irrelevant at stage II. In this case the above derivatives, (5.12) and 
(5.13), are both negative and hence, for all X, > 0, the antidumping law will not bind. 
Figure IV below depicts this situation. 
PTj-
Figure IV: Derivative I 
We can, therefore, conclude that if Z > 0, the foreign firm's optimal sales in the 
home country are such that dumping does not take place no matter how severe the 
dumping penalty may be, i.e.. 
—  7  Y  *  X , = — + ^ < X ,  \ / s  
" 4 / 3  2  "  
(5.14) 
If Z<0(Yi  > Y") ,  there are two possibilities for the optimal choice of : 
i. Pj- + t = P^, i.e. the foreign price plus the transportation cost is kept equal to the price in 
the home market. The foreign firm would like to dump, but is discouraged fi^om doing so 
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by the tariff Thus, the foreign firm does not pay any dumping tariff, but the presence of 
t h e  t a r i f f  m o d i f i e s  i t s  c h o i c e  o f  X ^ ,  a n d ,  h e n c e ,  m a y  a l t e r  t h e  s t a g e  I  c h o i c e  o f  X , .  
ii. P f  + t >  which means that the foreign firm finds it optimal to dump and pay 
dumping tariff in equilibrium. 
We analyze these cases in a little more detail. 
Case I 
In this case the foreign firm avoids dumping in the home country, even though it 
would like to do so in the absence of a dumping tariff. Although there is a positive 
dumping tariff which is levied on imports if they are found dumped in the home country, 
in this case the foreign firm (in equilibrium) chooses a level of sales in the home market 
such that it keeps the price in the home country equal to the price charged in the foreign 
country plus transportation cost. Thus, the foreign firm does not pay any dumping tariff 
This case arises if the first order condition (5.12) is non-negative and (5.13) is non-positive, 
* 
and, hence, the optimal choice^;, would be equal to the critical level X^ i.e., ; 
=  -Z>0 (5.15) 
dKj-
= -SpX  ^ -(l + 5)Z<0 (seeFigure V) (5.16) 
x: 
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Kf  
Figure V: Derivative n 
This can only be tme if > 
. sp j , I.e., 
if X,> -{ l  + S)Z '  
. 
dn, 
> 0 ,  dTt j  < 0 ,  (5.17) 
then Jf, = X=—+-^ 
'  " ip  2 
(5.18) 
Therefore, = X f ^  for all { 5 ,  X , ,  Z )  that satisfy the condition Z  
Intuitively, this case is very likely to occur when the penalty for dumping is very high 
(large 5) or the foreign firm's capacity is very large. The later implies large foreign sales in 
the home market on which the dumping tariff is applied. 
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Case n 
This is the situation where the foreign firm, in the presence of antidumping laws in 
the home country, finds it optimal to keep on exercising price discrimination between 
foreign and home markets. In this case, the foreign firm's optimal sales in the home 
market exceed the critical level , even though this causes dumping (P^ + t> P^) and 
the firm has to a pay dumping tariff (r). Unlike Staiger & Wolak (1992) and Gruenspech 
(1988), the treatment of the antidumping tariff is not restricted to a prohibitive tariff in 
this model. In our model, the dumping tariff, which is some proportion of the dumping 
margin, may assume any value between zero and infinity. 
The condition under which it is optimal for foreign sales in the home country to 
exceed X,^ is: 
(5.19) 
This gives: 
(5.20) 
Above derivatives are represented by the Figure VI. 
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nf  
Figure VI; Derivative HI 
Therefore, the optimal foreign sales in the home country X^>X^ for all (X,,Z,5) 
which satisfy the condition X ,  <  ''-{\+5)Z^ 
S f i  
L and so dumping occurs (x > 0). The foreign 
sales in the home country are obtained in this case from equation (5.11) as follows: 
y ^ y 
" 4/3 4(l + <5) ' (5.21) 
The above expression for X^ is exactly the same as what we get in the unconstrained case 
in chapter IV if ^ = 0 is substituted in the equation. The foreign firm uses a similar rule, 
adjusted for dumping tariff, for allocating its sales in the home and foreign countries in this 
case which it would use in an unconstrmned situation But now, since dumping results, it 
must pay a penalty to the home country and thereby reduces sales in the home country. 
Further, in this case, the choice of capacity by the foreign firm will be altered (which we 
will show in the following section). As opposed to case I, this situation arises when the 
dumping tariff the foreign firm has to pay is small, either due to small a dumping penalty ( 
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small 5) or because the foreign sales in the home markets are not very large because of the 
small foreign capacity {X,). Hence, the firm finds it optimal to dump and pay the tariff. 
From here onward, we refer to DI as the domain where dumping laws do not 
* 
matter, i.e., where Z > 0(J^ < Y")  and, therefore,optimal X^<X^.  The Z < 0(]^ > Y")  
space is divided into two regions. DII refers to the domain, where in the presence of a 
antidumping law in the home country, dumping does not occur, but the antidumping law 
« 
modifies the firm's behavior (X^ = X^ and r = 0). Dili is the domain in which the 
« 
foreign sales in the home market exceed the critical level ( X^> X^ ), and thus, dumping 
takes place and T > 0 .  The line that separates DII and Dili, 
^  ^  Y=Y' '  + ,  ^  • X . , is referred to as the boundary (B). (1 + ^ ) ' (l + (5) ' ^ ' 
Domain 1 no dumping region as 
Domain 2 where firm avoids dumping as 
Domain 3 where firm pays dumping tariff as 
Boundary of domains 2 & 3 as 
These domains are illustrated in Figure VII. 
DI where Y,<Y' 
DII  where7"  <Y<Y'+—X,  
\ + 5  '  
Dili where Y.>Y'^—X, 
'  \+d '  
B where Y,=^Y'+-^X. 
'  l  + S  '  
Some important results which we get from the solution of the stage II problem of 
the foreign firm deserve some special attention. These results are; 
a) The antidumping tariff rule which we are using in our model is not differentiable 
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Figure Vll: Domains 
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* X +V' '  — V * y  4-v — Y 
everywhere ,  i.e., r = QifX^<X^= —-—^ ^and r  >  0  i f  X^> X^= —-— 
and this causes non differentiability in the foreign firm's profit function in X^. 
b) The rules that the foreign firm uses to distribute its sales in home and foreign markets. 
From these rules we get the foreign firm's response to the home firm's sales in the home 
. These rules are different in all three domains. This difference in the market. 
foreign firm's stage II allocation rules has an important bearing on the home firm because 
it takes into account this response while making the stage I decision. One of the 
components of the home firm's stage I decision is the response of the foreign firm to the 
home firm's sales in the home market, which is different in the different domains. This 
response of the foreign firm, which can also be called the foreign firm's stage II best 
response fianction, has different slopes in each domain and, therefore, has kinks at the 
boundaries of the domains (see Figure VIII). This may, thereby, cause jumps 
(discontinuity) in the home firm's stage I reaction function. 
sy. 
4 
]_ 
2 
4 
if 
if 
if 
Dl(r  =  0)  
DII (T =  0)  
Dl l l ( r>0)  
(5.22) 
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Domain DI Domain DII Domain Dili 
Figure VHI: Foreign Firm's Stage EL Reaction Function 
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As we discussed about the solution strategy in chapter III, these types of two-stage 
games are solved by backward induction method, i.e., the stage II is solved first and after 
that the stage I problem is solved. Thus, we can now analyze the stage I problem of the 
foreign firm. 
Stage I 
At this stage of the game, the firm chooses its capacity ( X, ) and the rule for 
determining the capacity gives the foreign firm's stage I best response function. We have 
already set up the foreign firm's profit function (5.8). The foreign firm's profit function at 
this stage is: where X^ is the optimal value of X^ determined at stage II. 
When partially differentiated with respect to X^ , the following first order condition is 
obtained: 
3^, 
dn,  
\^h y ar, 
(5.23) 
We have shown in the previous section that, if Z > 0, then the optimal foreign sales in the 
= 0, and dumping does not take place. ^ Z X,  
Xk 
home market are: X^ = —+—and 
' 4y5 2 
— — , then X. = —+^-"7—and dumping occurs, but 
5p ) Ap 4(1+d) 
dn f 
—— = 0. Thus, for these cases the envelope theorem can be used which implies that 
the first term, /cX^ )(^fc /3X^), in the above first order condition vanishes. 
However, if Z < 0 and Z, > V. - V- i"-j;, -f, 
sp 
envelope theorem cannot be applied. 
> 0, then X^ = X^= ^ H—and the 
2 2 
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— Z X In domain DL Z > 0, then = 1—-
" 4)0 2 V X, , and = 0, and thus: 
^7r,{X,-X,)  dK, 
SX^ dX, 
= 2pX^-ipX, +a-(C +li) + SpX^=Q (5.24) 
When value of for this domain is substituted in the above, it yields: 
X = K  +  Y'-Y,  (5.25) 
For Z < 0, we have seen in the previous section that which stage II solution 
prevails depends, among other things, on the foreign firm's capacity (A',). 
For X.> 
f .  { \+S)Z 
sp , 
> 0, we have found that the foreign firm does not pay any tariff 
* Y" -Y X (r = 0), although the antidumping law binding, and hence = X^ = 
2 2 
therefore the envelope theorem cannot be applied, and: 
(dn 
3K, \^h J dX, 
= (2 ,^ +Z-'XpxJA*2fiX,- ipX,  +a-(C + 7) = 0 (5.26) 
When substitution for X^ is made, it gives: 
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y - y  
x = K + - — ^  (5.27) 
The capacity choice or the best response function in this domain (DII) is identical to what 
we have found in DI. This case is a typical example of a multi-market monopolist. In the 
case of linear demand, like our model, when a constraint which prohibits exercising price 
discrimination is imposed on this monopolist the total output produced by this monopolist 
remains unaltered. The capacity choice of the foreign firm is not affected, but only the 
rules of allocating the total output in the two markets are adjusted. Thus, we have 
identical stage I solution rules for the foreign firm in DI and DII. 
However, for 0 < A', < illMl T Z . 
sp 4/3  4(1+<5) ' and therefore. 
^  -  2 ^ ,  +  «  -  ( C  +  ^ ) + =  0  (5.28) 
yielding: 
X = (5.29) 
The above expression represents the foreign firm's solution rule or best response function 
in domain Dili, which is different than the one in DII, but when these derivatives, (5.26) 
and (5.28), are evaluated at A', = ^-{\+S)Z^ 
sp 
1 ,  we get ; 
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' ps 
= 4y0^A:+(4 + 6^)Z (5.30) 
This shows that there is no jump in the foreign firm's solution rule (best response) fi^om 
DII to Dili, which implies that the profit fiinction is continuous. 
When these solution rules are combined over the three domains, the foreign firm's 
stage I best response function is obtained (Figure IX). Then we can find foreign firm's 
sales in the foreign market by subtracting foreign sales in the home market ( A!";, ) from its 
capacity (X, ) 
The results of this chapter are summarized as follows: 
Domain DI 
Z > 0  = >  Y'>Y^ (dumping never occurs) (5.31) 
* 
X^<X^ => T = 0 (5,32) 
2 4 
(5.33) 
(5.34) 
(5.35) 
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Dil i  
Y,=Y'+-r-^ (1 + ^) 
2K +r 
DII  
Slope = -2 
DI 
Slope = -2 
t Y'  K + — 
Figure IX : Foreign Firm's Stage I Best Response Function 
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Domain DII 
Z <0 => >¥'  ( firm avoids dumping ) 
=> Y.<Y'+-^'  
r = 0 
' 2 2 
X , = K  +  Y ' ' - Y ,  
^ 2 2 2  
Domain Dili ( dumping occurs and the firm pays dumping penalty ) 
Z < 0 => 
z> => r,>Y'+-^' 
(1+5) ' (1 + 5) 
y (2+5) r -Y,  
* 4(1+5) ' 4 
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{2  +  3S)X,  y+Y,  
4(1+ (5) 4 (5.46) 
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CHAPTER VI 
HOME FIRM AND ANTIDUMPING LAW 
The home firm's Stage II and Stage I problems analytically remain identical to the 
unconstrained case. Although the home firm's objective fianction does not depend on 
whether or not antidumping laws are present in the home country, its best response (the 
solution rule) is affected by the presence or absence of antidumping laws in the country. 
In all three domains, as defined earlier, the home firm's solution strategy is different 
because the foreign firm's sales in the home market are sensitive to the presence of the 
antidumping laws in the home country. When there is a penalty for dumping in the home 
country, the domestic firm has an incentive to expand its sales and force the foreign firm 
to cut back its sales in the home market or pay the dumping tariff and the home firm 
incorporates this response into its stage I solution rule. At stage I the home firm 
maximizes the following profit function with respect to V,. 
>^Ay,.J'',) = (P,-c)y,(y„x,)-^y,)+A[r,-Z(y„x,)] (e.i) 
The first order condition provides the home firm's best response function as given below. 
h _ 
cK dr. 
+ 
dTtu dX 
— —  
dX ^ 
+ 
8Ku 
( * ^  
+ 
J 
= 0 (6.2) 
The first two terms of the first order condition vanish because of the complementary 
slackness condition and the rest can be written as: 
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djt 
'• -- + A — 7^ — 0 (6.3) 
^TT We know that —- = -PY^ and = 1 and by substituting X from chapter IV in to the 
dY. 
above we get the following. 
Ol^ Oly^ 
(6.4) 
From the previous chapters it can be shown that given 
s.t. y,<r => = = (6.5) 
s.t. 7, G r , r + - ^  
1+5 '• 2 dY, 2 
X„Y^ s.t. ¥^>7" + + = . (6.7) 
\ + 5 '' 4 4(l + (?) SY, 4 
It is clear that though Xy, is continuous it is not everywhere difFerentiable, and that 
causes a non-concavity in the home firm's profit fimction,;^;, = [y,;X^(?;)]. This non-
concavity in the home firm's profit fiinction results in discontinuity in its stage I best 
response Sanction which, thereby, may lead to the existence of multiple solutions in our 
model. 
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Unlike the unconstrained case, we cannot get the home firm's stage I best response 
function in one step here. In the presence of antidumping laws there are different solution 
rules in different domains for the home firm. Therefore, we have to construct the home 
firm's stage I best response function by putting together all the solution rules it uses in 
various domains. We define Rj as the home firm's stage I solution rule in domain DI and 
similarly R2 and R3 are its solution rules in domains DII and Dili, respectively. These are 
given below. 
dn h _ where Y, <r (6.8) 
STV 
- = R2 where 
\ l -hS • )  
(6.9) 
dn 
- = /?3 where 7 ,  > r+-^X,  
1 + <J ' 
(6.10) 
3^ When appropriate values for and fi-om domain DI, DII, and Dili are 
substituted into equation (6.4), we get the solution rules Rj^ R2^ and ^3 in the following 
form. 
n Ri ; —- = 
2 4 
= 0 or (6.11) 
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R2:  
dTj;  h _ A-{C + ri)-^PY, A+Ilzl 
2 2 
= 0 or (6.13) 
^ ' 2 2 
(6.14) 
R3 ; —- = 
or, 
^ 2+d „  r - r ,^  
Xs + 
4(1 + <J) ' 4 = 0 or (6.15) / 
Rj:  r ,=2i - I l -x ,  
' 3 6 '  
2 + (5 
6(1+ <5) (6.16) 
A point to emphasize here is that i?,, , and are not true reaction functions, 
but a certain portion of each may be used by the home firm to find its best response in 
domains DI, DII, and Din, respectively. Figure X depicts all three of the home firm's 
solution rules. A few important points on that diagram are defined as follows: 
Rl and R2 intersect at(-Y,, 7,) = (A", 7) = ^{L-yy- (6.17) 
as X, s.t. i?2[X2;r] = 0 (6.18) 
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/ 
Dm 
T>0 
DH 
T=0 
Figure X: Home Firm's Solution Rules 
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X, as X, s.t .  /?,[Z,;7"] = 0 (6.19) 
X^ as X, s.t .  for R^, r-Y,+-^X,=0 
l + S 
(6.20) 
X^ as X, s.t .  for R^, 7"-7,+ , = 0 
l  + S 
(6.21) 
As we have shown that given 7, < Y" 
dn 
dY, 
^  = R,= 1 X, (r-Y, 
4 ' 2 I 4 
= ? (6.22) 
and the limit of the function i?, when 7, approaches Y' from below is: 
dK. 
c¥, 
Y,-*r" 
(6.23), 
if X>X =2i:--7% then 
' 2 
the value of the above derivative is negative, so a local solution exists for ,}^ < 7" and 
therefore, /?, is relevant. 
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7 if X, < X^=2L-—Y' '  ^  then the above derivative (6.23) would be positive and, 
* 
therefore, there is no solution fox Y,  ,Y,  <¥".  This implies that the home firm's profits are 
rising at this point, and therefore, its optimal response(7*) must be greater than Y" and, 
thus, we have a local solution Y*>Y''. We can summarize this in the following way. 
=> , r>y^  (6.24)  
This means that if the foreign firm chooses any X^ which is less than X,, then i?, is not an 
appropriate solution rule for the home firm. In this case either R^oxRi or the boundary 
would be a relevant solution rule for the home firm. Similarly, for 
/ 
Y" e r , r + — X ,  I ,  
1 + ^  ' '  
;i _ n _ 3 z ,  [r-Y,  
2 ' 2 I 2 
= 7 (6.25) 
dn. 1-IY,-^ 
2 ' 2 
= ? ,and (6.26) 
if X,>X^=2L-3Y'  , then (6.27) 
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dn.  
< 0  V X,>X^Jt<Y'  (6.28) 
Likewise, if the foreign firm chooses any S Xj, the appropriate solution rule for the 
home firm is i?,, and therefore, ^6 "ot relevant in this case, and there is a local 
solution Y'  < Y" for X, > X2.  
I f  X,<X2=2L-3Y% 
dn.  
> 0  (6.29) 
Therefore, a local solution for Y^ exists, Yt > Y",  and there may be a local solution in DI, 
Y' < Y\ However, if 
2L - 3.5Y' = X,<X,<X2=2L-sr (6.30) 
cY. 
>0 and —-
r,-*Y' 
< 0  (6.31) 
It is now clear that at ,;r^(y, > F") < TCf^iY^ < 7"), and therefore, the home firm 
uses solution rule i?, to find its best response to the foreign firm's X^ > X^ and Y* < 7".  
It is also true that at X^,7t^,{Y^ > Y") > 7r^{Y, < Y") and the optimal response of the home 
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firm is Y'  > Y",  and therefore, is not a relevant solution rule. However, we don't know 
which solution rule would be relevant for the home firm when the foreign firm chooses 
g(X j ,X2).  We have two local solutions in this domain and same is true about points 
X^ and ^4 (which we will analyze in detail in proceeding chapters). 
At this stage we try to find multiple (two local) solutions when the foreign firm 
chooses X, &[X^,Xj)va order to find a unique solution rule (best response fianction) 
which can represent the home firm's behavior globally. For this we must explore 
situations that might exist where the home firm's profits with < 7" (in DI)are identical 
to its profits with Y^ > Y' (in DII). When we do so, it is found that: 
3 X s.t. = 
and (6.32)1 
3 5.^. n,{R,)  = 7t ,{B) 
and 
(6.33) 
X' 4X,;X,]  
The implication here, is that the home firm is indifferent between Y^^X^and Fjas the 
best response to the foreign firm's X, = X, and either J^(X^)or B(^X^) would be its best 
choice when the foreign firm chooses X, = X^ and these cause discontinuities in the home 
firm's reaction function at these points. Therefore, we may have muhiple solutions: Xj ( 
in DI), X, and X^ (in DII) or, similarly, Xj (in DI), X', and Xf ( at the boundary ). 
All of the above can be summarized as follows: 
'For detailed derivation see Appendix A, and B. 
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X,<X^ => Rjis the relevant solution rule. (6.34) 
and solution is in DHL 
> X, > => no solution in i?3 relevant. (6.35) 
and solution will be in DII. 
X, = X => R^orR^is  the solution rule (6.36) 
and solution may be in DI or DII. 
X^ < Xt < X^ => Solution on the boundary of DII and DHL (6.37) 
X,<X^ => optimal Y, > Y'  (6.38) 
X,> X^ => optimal < Y' .  (6.39) 
When this information is combined with the solution rules for the home firm in 
three domains, we obtain a solution rule that represent the home firm's behavior globally 
and this provides a stage I best response Sanction for this firm. One such best response 
function for the home firm, which shows only one jump (discontinuity) fi"om DI to DII at 
X, is dravra in Figure XI .The reaction fimction is drawn in thick lines and the 
discontinuity in shown by a thick dashed line. Some important points, additional to those 
described on the previous figure, are explained below. 
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x>0 
DE 
1=0 
X X 
Figure XI: Home Firm's Stage I Reaction Function 
90 
X as X, s.t .  = 0 (6.40) 
X as X, s.t .  /?,[^;r2] = 0 (6.41) 
X' as X, s.t .  /?,[^^] = 0 (6.42) 
X' as X, s.t .  B[X'] = Q (6.43) 
Where is obtained by solving and Y2 .R^{x,Y.^. Given the above explanation 
and the diagram, it is clear that if: 
Xi <X^ => i?3 is the relevant solution rule. (6.44) 
JSf, > X, > X4 => no solution in ,11^ is relevant. (6.45) 
X, <X^ => optimal Y^>Y' (6.46) 
X,> X2 => optimal Y,<Y^ (6.47) 
The other possible reaction functions which depict a discontinuity from DI to the 
boundary and both a jumps from DI to II and DI to the boundary will be analyzed in the 
following chapters where we try to characterize the solution of this model. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SOLUTION OF THE MODEL 
The major portion of the rest of the dissertation will be devoted to outlining the 
solution (solutions) of our model. In the duopoly games, like our model, that are 
characterized by the best response functions, the solution is obtained where best 
responses of the two firms coincide or, graphically, where the best response curves of the 
two firms intersect. It has already been shown that best responses of home and foreign 
firms are, in the end, functions of the parameters of the model. Therefore, the solution to 
our model is predicated upon the values of these parameters which include demand and 
cost conditions in home and foreign countries and an antidumping tariff in the home 
country. 
In the last chapter we derived a stage I best response function for the home firm. 
Given the best response curve in Figure VII, it was explained that if 
X,<X^ => i?3  i s  the  re levant  so lu t ion  ru le  
and the solution is in Dili. 
< X, < => The solution is on the boundary of DII and DHL 
X^> X,> X^ => no  so lu t ion  in  i i , ,  i s  re levant  
and the solution will be in DII. 
X, <Xi => optimal Y, > Y'  
X,>X, optimal Y, < Y^.  
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Xj = X => R^ ori?2 is the solution rule 
and the solution may be in DI or DII. 
The above explains what solution rules the home firm would use in different 
domains. However the problem here is that all these domains are not fixed, they depend 
on the parameters of the model. Whenever there is a change in the values of the 
parameters, these domains would change too. The no-dumping and dumping regions are 
affected whenever the value of Y' alters and, furthermore, within dumping region 
domains DII and Dili change with a change in the dumping penalty (the value of 5 ): as 
S gets bigger, domain DII gets larger and domain Dili, where the foreign firm chooses to 
dump in the home country and pay antidumping tariff, shrinks. This also affects values of 
the variables X^ and X^ while X^,X2, and X remain unchanged because they are 
independent of J, as can be seen below. 
AT - LY" 
(7.1) 
X^=^L^ (7.2)  
1 = 21-3.22487' (7.3) 
^)(4i-7r) (7.4) ^3 = 
= = = (7.5) 
93 
X = l + <5 
l + 3t? 
41-67" 
X,{5  = 0)  =  41-67" = ^ , 
Z,(<J^oo) = i 41-67" 
(7.6) 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
(7.9) 
The above variables, the relationship among them, and their dependence on 5 are 
summarized in Figure XII along with the relevant domains. Since all these variables, and 
thereby the solution of our model depend on the values of the parameters, therefore, 
when we let the parameters of our model assume different values, the solution to the 
model changes. In order to handle this problem we may employ the following strategy. 
We divide the whole parameter space into two main subsets such that in one parameter 
space dumping will always take place in an unconstrained Nash equilibrium and, similarly, 
there may exist a parameter space where dumping, according to our definition of the 
model, will never occur. We examine these parameter spaces thoroughly as we move 
along, and define the restrictions on the parameters of the model under which these sub-
spaces can be valid. 
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Solution in DI 
6.4496F" 
Solution in DII 
Solution, on 
the Boundary 
Solutioi in Dili 
8 
Figure Xn: Solutions 
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Dumping Solution 
We start with the assumption that, absent antidumping laws, if the foreign firm 
sells in both the home and foreign markets, the resulting Nash equilibrium is in domain D 
III, where dumping takes place. According to the specification we laid down in chapter 
IV, this implies being in the dumping region where the main restriction on the parameters 
is the following. 
When written in terms of the parameters of the model the above restriction implies: 
and if we assume identical cost conditions in both countries it reduces to the following. 
From the earlier chapters we know that the home and foreign firms use the 
following solution strategies (solution rules) in this domain (Dili). 
AL-IK-IY" =J>0. (7.10) 
(7.11) 
Sa + l t -3A-2[C + r])>0 (7.12) 
(7.13) 
and 
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'2  + 5\  X (4 + 4<5-5^) 
^  + 1 —=^X =0 
4(1+ «5) (7.14) 
We solve the above two equations simultaneously using Cramer's Rule and get the 
Nash solution for stage I variables in this domain (7/, X, ) as follows. 
2 
2 
2 + d 
4(1+ (5) 
(1-5) 
Y, 
- ' J 
L-I l  
4 
(7.15) 
We group some terms and define 
5 = 
4(1 +(5) 
and m = 
\  + d 
V y 
(7.16) 
therefore, 
'RY  (1-5) 
_ 1 
~  D  {2  +  5 )  
4 
4(1+ <5) 
2 
2 
L-r. 
4 
(7.17) 
where D is calculated as below. 
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^ 3(1-5) {2 + Sf  24(l-5)(l + ^ )-(2 + J)' 
2 16(l + <5)" 16(l + <5) 
^ [4(1 + ^ )] r6(l-5)-(l + 5)]^5-75 
14(1 + ^ )11 4 J 4 
Hence, after simplification, the Nash solution in this domain is: 
(7.18) 
Y'  = 4{\-S)L-2Y'  -2mK 
5-75 (7.19) 
and 
6/:+-fi+-lr-2fi+-lz, 
2V 2)  1, 2 j  
5-75 
(7.20) 
In the absence of an antidumping law in the home country S = 0=>S = 0=>m = 1, 
therefore. 
j^V = o) = AL-2Y' ' -2K and (7.21) 
eK^-Y'- lL 
X^^{5 = 0) = 2 (7.22) 
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What we need to check at this stage is whether this Nash solution is consistent 
with the restrictions to be in the domain Dili. One of these restrictions, in this case, is 
that the solution should be such that dumping always takes place, i.e., in equilibrium 
must be greater than the threshold level Y". Absent any antidumping tariff this means that 
r/((5 = 0)>7^ 
r/(«5 = o)-r = AL-IY'-IK -Y'  =1 (7.23) 
= ^ L-2K-1Y'  >0 (7.24) 
This satisfies the restriction because to begin with we assumed AL-2K- lY" > 0 for the 
solution to be in domain Dili. In this case, the antidumping laws are present and the 
dumping tariff is imposed, the equilibrium Y, being in Dili implies that Y, must be greater 
than Y, at the boundary of DII and Dili, i.e., Y,^ > 7/. 
Yf =Y' '  + 
—V. i + s j  '  (7.25) 
Y - Y "  =  _ 4{l  -  S)L -  lY" -2mK 
5-7S 
- r -
U + <^ 
6K + 
IH}'- 21 1 + 1IZ 
5-7S 
{20 + 203-7S^J {20+ 203-7S^ J {20 + 2QS-7S^J 
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AL-2K 
'2 + lS 
2  +  36  ]- 77^ >0 (7.26) 
We can find the bound on 5 that maintains the inequality in equation (7.26) to 
ensure the solution in domain DHL We also find fiirther restrictions on the parameters of 
our model so that dumping takes place in equilibrium. In order to do so we fiirther group 
some terms. Let 
41 - lY' 
and being in dumping domain implies that m = > 1. Now we can write equation 
2K 
(7.26) as follows: 
' 2+15  
xn-
lim 
U + 3«5 
>0? (7.28) 
2  +  15  
m - \  
2  +  35  
= m-^ (7.29) 
7 7 Therefore, if gt > —, VJ we have a unique solution in Dili. But what if C7 < j ? 
7 
—  > m > l  => 3 5  s . t  5 < ^, solution is in Dili (7.30) 
(2 + ld\  „ 
• -  =  0  
{2  +  35J  
5 :  m- \   (7.31) 
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{7 -3m}  (7.32) 
This further tightens the bounds on the parameters for the solution to be in domain 
DHL This implies that if the antidumping penalty (S) is greater than S then the solution is 
either on the Boundary (boundary of DII and Dili) Figure XIII, where the sales are 
Solution in DIH Solution in DH 
or on Boundaiy 
Figure Xm 
chosen such that the price in the foreign country plus transportation cost are exactly equal 
to the price in the home country, or in domain DII, where the foreign firm always keep the 
price in the foreign market, inclusive of transportation costs, lower than the home market 
price, and avoids any antidumping charges against it. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure the solution to be in domain Dili where dumping 
takes place in equilibrium, following restriction should also be fulfilled. 
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(2,  + 75\ 
If  VT> I 2^3^J,we always have a unique interior solution in domain Dili no matter what 
the size of the dumping penalty (5) may be. Otherwise, we need the following restrictions 
on the parameter values of the model in order for the solution to be in DHL 
AT _  77® 
i. i<T>l => -= >1 => 'M-IK-IY'  >0 (7.33) 
2K 
ii. 14.fi: + 2 i r -12L>0  (7.34) 
i«, p,35) (7-3cr) 14^ + 2 i r -12Z  ^ 
In the presence of antidumping laws, other possible equilibria may be on the 
boundary of DII and Dili or in domain DII. Now we find the subset of the parameter 
space in which the solution to the stage I game is on the boundary of domain DII and 
DHL The solution rule for the home firm, in this case, is the equation for the line which 
defines the boundary of domain DII and DEI, which is as follows: 
Y,-r-^-^y,=0 (7.36) 
and the solution rule for the foreign firm is: 
(7.37) 
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Solving equations (7.36) and (7.37) simultaneously, we get the following solution for the 
foreign and home firm, respectively. 
X f = ^ K  
2  +  3S  
R  =Y' '+2K\  f—1 
(7.38) 
(7.39) 
By construction, Y,"  is on the boundary of domain DII and Dili, but for XF to be 
a  valid solution, it has to fulfill the condition that XJ < XF < X^. Where X^ and X^ are 
as defined earlier, they are obtained, respectively, by solving the home firm's solution rules 
for domain Dili and DII simultaneously with the equation for the boundary. 
(7.40) 
(7.41) 
X F - X , > 0  2K{2  +  7S)  - (2 + 25)[AL - 7r ) > 0 (7.42) 
X F - X ^ > 0  m < 
\2 + 7dy (7.43) 
x ^ - x f > o  = >  
{2  + 3S)  (7.44) 
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X^-Xf>0 => (7.45) 
^ '  [ 2  +  3SJ  2K  ^  '  
For further facilitation, we define: 
-s, 
The bound on 5 firom equation (7.45) fiirther tightens the bound on the parameter 
space as follows: 
-  2 (cT- l  +  a )  S = -} { (7.47) 
3(2 - <T - ttr) 
and when d  and S are compared, it is found that S>d .  Therefore, in terms of 6, the 
equilibrium is on the boundary if S<5< 5. In order for a unique equilibrium to take 
place on the boundary of domains DII and Dili, the constraint on the parameter values 
which are implied firom equations (7.43) and (7.45) must hold and are given below. 
{2  +  3S)  
f ( 2  +  l S ) ' ]  
Now we try to find conditions under which the Nash equilibrium at stage I of the 
game occurs in domain DII where the solution rules for the home firm and the foreign firm 
are given below, respectively. 
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Y , = L -
and 
X, +r (7.49) 
X , = K  +  r-Y,  (7.50) 
Solving these equations, (7.49) and (7.50), by the Cramer's rule, we get the solution 
values for the stage I variables as follows; 
2 4K + 3Y'-2L 4-i iT-o-
and 
(7.51) 
2  AL-IK-^Y" m-l  + Aa (7.52) 
For the above solution to be valid, the resulting solution must be in domain DII, 
which implies 7/  > Y'  and Xf > X^.  
Y,^ -Y" >0 => (<» -1) + cr > 0 (7.53) 
X f - X ^ > 0  4K + 3Y'-2L^ f l  + S^j '4L-6Y' '^  
1 + 3M 2 
> 0  (7.54) 
X. -  X.>0 => a  <\ -  a 
\2 + 3S) (7.55) 
105 
Therefore, a valid interior solution in domain DII requires the following restriction 
on the parameter values of the model. 
\ - < j < ( 0 < \  - c r  ( 7 . 5 6 )  
2  +  35 )  
and if we assume that m>\ then we have a unique equilibrium in domain DII as long as: 
'2  + 65^ 
l < c o  <  {2  +  3S  - a  (7.57) 
Similarly, we define the restrictions on the parameter values, which are necessary 
to meet the solution of the model to occur in domain DI, where the home firm follows 
AL-Y" - 6Y, - 2X, = 0 rule and the foreign firm uses 2K + 2X^ = 0 rule to 
find the solution of the game. These solution rules, when solved simultaneously, yield the 
following solution for domain DI. 
12^ + 77^-41 X = (7 58) 
' 1 0  
BL-4r -4K 
10  ^
Validity of these solutions also depends upon whether or not certain restrictions 
are  met. One of these restrictions is that the solution value 7/ has to be less than Y", and 
the other condition for the solution to be in DI is that must be greater than X when 
X> X^ or X] is greater than Xg when X <X^. Y" and X^ have already been defined 
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whereas A!" is a point at which the home firm's best response function jumps from domain 
DI ( solution rule i?,) to domain DII (to solution rule R2 ). Similarly, is a point 
where this jump occurs from DI to the boundary of DII and DHL We derive X in 
Appendix B which is  independent  of  5  and is  equal  to  2Z, -  3.22487" = K[(o + 0.55a-) .  
This implies that X falls between Z, and X.^,  i.e., X2 > X > X^.  
Y:  -V <0 => m<l (7.60) 
X j > X > 0  = >  ( l2K + 7Y' ' -4L^ 
10 
- Ar(G7' + 0.55(T) > 0 (7.61) 
X > X ,  
m < l -  0 . 2 3 a  
K{m + 0.5Scr) - K[ttT + cr) > 0 \  + d 
1 + 3^ 
m> 
o-(0.45-0.65^) 
2d 
(7.62) 
(7.63) 
(7.64) 
At this stage it would be appropriate to summarize the resuhs of this section by 
showing equilibrium in each domain along with the corresponding parameter space. 
Given ms 4L-7Y'  
2K 
and a = 
2K 
„  (2 + ld\  ,  If ru>\ >1, {2+35) Solution in Dili (7.65) 
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If (2 + 6d\  [(2 + 75) {2 + 3S) U2 + 3<5)J 
T^- 1 f2 + 6(5^ If 1 - o" < <y < - a {2 + 36 J 
Solution on boundary (7.66) 
Solution in Dili (7.67) 
If m <\ Solution in DI (7.68) 
Therefore, given lir > 1, we have unique solution: 
in DIII if w> (2 + 15^ [2+36J (7.69) 
on Boundary if f2 + 66\  [2 + 35] < m <  
' {2 + 76) '  
,(2 + 3J)J (7.70) 
in DII if ,'2 + 66^ 1 < <a < \-cr 
2 + 36 
(7.71) 
NO-DUMPmC SOLUTION 
We have seen above that the parameter space in which we have no dumping 
solution, i.e., when parameter values are such that cr < 1, the foreign and home firms' best 
response curves intersect in domain DI. One possible situation is where the home and 
foreign firms' best response curves intersect only in DI and this can happen if the foreign 
firm's best response curve remains above the home firm's reaction curve in domains DII 
and DIII. A restriction that ensures this possibility is: X^> X^, or equivalently 
ATj) > Y", where X2 is obtained by evaluating the home firm's solution rule at Y" 
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and and Y''[X2) are obtained by solving the foreign firm's solution rule at Y' and X^, 
respectively. 
Rather interesting situations in our model are those when possibilities of multiple 
solutions emerge, i.e., when the foreign firm's reaction curve intersects the home firm's 
reaction curve in DI and either in DII or on the boundary. Now we explore the conditions 
under which multiple solutions may occur in domains DI and DII or in domain DI and on 
the boundary. One of restrictions to ensure intersections of the home and the foreign 
firms' best response curves in DII is that X^ > X^ , where X^ is as defined earlier and X^ 
is the solution value of X, in domain DII. It means that if X^ < X^, solution never takes 
place in DII, but it may take place on the boundary of DII and Dili, and in terms of 
restriction on the parameter values: 
if ?zr+<7 < 2, a solution in domain DII is also possible along with solution in DI. These 
resuUs are graphically represented in Figure XIV. Solution in DII possible if, given 
cr + o-<2; 
X^> X.2^ => c7<l-cr (unique solution in DI). 
(2+65^ 
[2+33) 
This implies that if or+cr > 2, 2+66 = 2 , there is no solution in DII. However, 
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m 
2  +  7 5  
Dill only 
Boundary only 
2  +  3 5  
2-CJ-
Dll only 
Dl and Boundary 2  +  6 S  
2 + 35 
Dl and Dll 
Dl only 
Figure XIV: Solution of the Model 
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•  _  2 f  c7 + cr-l^  
3y2-nr-aJ X,'>X^ => S>S = - (7.72) 
Therefore, intersection of foreign and home firms' best response curves in domain DII is 
possible only if: 
1> cr+<T _ -  2f t(T+cr-n <2; <5>- (7.73) 3[2-aT - a J  
We have already discussed in the previous chapters that there is a possible jump in 
the home firm's best response curve either fi-om i?, to the boundary or fi-om i?, to The 
jump from /?, to occurs at = X = 2L-3.22487'' = (it7+0.55<7)Ar, and given this, 
the solution of the model would be as follows: 
If < X < X^ Solution in DI only (7.74) 
If X>X^ but Solution in DI only (7.75) 
If X^,<X<Xl Solutions in DI, DII, and ^ (7.76) 
If X > X ]  Solution in DII only (7.77) 
We know that X >  X ^  and now we check when X ^ < X  :  
(X -  X^) = (21 - 3.224SY')  -  (21 - (7.78) 
I l l  
(1-^4)1^=0 <0 (7.79) 
fv  vr\  n r  s: ^  0.22487^ 0.1124cr ( X - X A > 0  i f  S > 5  =  = (7,80) 
^ ' 41-6.67347^ c7 + 0.1633cr ^ ^ 
X-X^ = (2Z-3.33487=)- ^4^-2Z + 37' (7.81) 
X - X f > 0  => (nr-l + 0.6628o-)>0 (7.82) 
X l - X  =  f l 3 ^ — 1 £ ± Z L  j  _  { 2 L  -  3 . 3 3 4 8 7 " )  ( 7 . 8 3 )  
Xl-X>Q => (l-Gr-0.46c7)>0 (7.84) 
The results of the above section are depicted by Figure XV and also summarized 
as follows: 
2 Given \<m+a<2\ S> — 
3 
(7,85) 
2-m-aJ 
if G7'< 1-0.66(7 => solution in DI only. (7.86) 
if 1 - 0.46cr > C7 > 1 - 0.66(j  => solution in DI, DII, and X. (7.87) 
if max(l,2-<T) > C7> 1-0.46<t and S>d=> solution in DII only. (7.88) 
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(7 
x]=x 1/.46 
Dll not pojssible 
Dl, Dll 
and 1/.66 
X 
pil only 
Dl only 
1 2 
Figure XV : Multiple Solutions 
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Where 5 in defined in equation (7.72). 
Similarly muhiple solutions may also occur on DI, boundary, and on the jump from 
DI to the boundary. As we have shown, it is possible for solution to take place on the 
boundary under the following restrictions on the parameter values; 
tD-<land c7 + cr>2 (7.89) 
or 
m<\,  m+<j <2,a.ndS>—\^ ^  M (7.90) 
3 y 2 - m - a  J  
Like the previous case, we have diflFerent solution under different conditions: 
if X>Xj •=> solution on B only. (7.91) 
X > X ]  = >  cr + 0.46o->l 
if Xl > X> X^ => solution onB, X, and DI (7.92) 
f G 7  + 0.46< T < l  
X  > X > X ,  ^  \  ^  ,  
^ [2(5Gr>c7(0.45-0.655) (7.93) 
if X < X ^ , X < X l  (7.94) 
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In this case we have to determine which solution dominates, i.e., where the home firm's 
profits are greater. Therefore, 
Solution in DI if X)<7r,[xf  ,Y, '{Xf))  (7.95) 
Solution in DI, A!", and boundary if Tr^{^Xf 7v^{^Xf ,Y/(^Xf)^ (7.96) 
Xf and Y,^ are the solution values on the boundary whereas, Y/{^Xf)  is the value of Y, 
obtained by using i?,  solut ion rule v/i thXf.  
The implications of the above results are that for the parameter values such that 
CT < 1, absent antidumping laws or when (5=0), we have an equilibrium where dumping 
does not take place. Intuitively, the dumping laws should not matter if enforced in such 
circumstances. However, the above situation suggests that as antidumping laws become 
available or as penalty for dumping becomes more stringent (6 is increased)), multiple 
solutions may emerge some of which would be in domains where antidumping laws bite 
and consequently affect decisions made by both firms. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
WELFARE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter we analyze the welfare consequences of antidumping tariff in the 
home country because in our model antidumping laws are enforced by the home country 
alone. The total welfare of the home country depends on: 
(i) the net benefit from production and consumption of this good which is area under 
the home market demand curve bounded by the total quantity consumed is this market less 
the cost of producing the home firm's output. 
(ii) The net trade effect which, in this case, is tariff revenues collected by the home 
government less the revenues accruing to the foreign firm which the firm repatriates to the 
foreign country. 
(8.1) 
0 
S(P,  +I-P,)x,-P,x,  = -x ,[pf i*S)-s(p,  +;))  (8,2) 
Therefore, the home country's total welfare (W) may be expressed as follows: 
»• = / />.{};+X,)d(Y,  + X.)  -  cK, -  />, X,+S{Pf +1- p,)x.  (8.3) 
0 
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If we are in a domain where dumping takes place in equilibrium, then all the 
variables affecting the home country's welfare and iy-), in their reduced form, 
are functions of dumping penalty rate {5).  In this domain imposition of antidumping tariff 
or increase in change in the dumping penalty rate (6) affects the home country's welfare as 
follows: 
35 
= A 
d5 85 
- c - A—--x.Pi-^ —+\P, +t-P,]Xu 85 dS 85 ^ ^  ^ 
.S{P,  8Pf dXf 
ydXf dd (8.4) 
3F 
65 
=  ( P , - c -  P ; { \  +  ( 5 ) ^ , )  +  + t - P , ) -  p ; { \  +  5 ) X , )  
as 
+ P f  +  t — p .  + d - J- (8.5) 
We have shown in the previous chapter that as long so J < ^, the equilibrium 
occurs in domain Din and as long as the dumping penalty rate varies in this range, i.e., 
S e ^ 0, , the equilibrium remains in this domain and the Nash equilibrium in this domain 
results in the following solutions for stage I variables for the foreign and home firms: 
6^ + 3.5(1 + 1)7"-2(1+ f)Z 
5-75 
(8.6) 
and 
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y'  = 4(1-S)L-2y^-2mK 
5-7S 
(8.7) 
We use these stage I solution values to find the reduced form solutions for other 
variables, i.e., express all variables in terms of the parameters of the model. In this 
domain (Dili) the rule which the foreign firm uses to allocate sales in the foreign market 
is; 
^ 4(1 + ^) ' 4 4 (8.8) 
By substituting X, aijd 7,, we get: 
(10 + nS)K + (J(l  + S)7Y'  -  ^(1 + S)4L 
4(l+^)(5-75) (8.9) 
Similarly, the foreign and home firms' sales in the home market for this domain are given 
below. 
K (2+(5) Y,  r 
'  4{l  + S) '  4 4 (8.10) 
_ [(2 + (5)7/;:-(1 +(5)81+(1 + ^)147''] 
~ 4(l + (5)(5-75') (8.11) 
and 
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_ 3 4(l-^)L-2r-2mg F = K = 
•"a 5-75 
(8.12) 
Given the Nash equilibrium in domain Dili, the price in the home country would be 
P, = A-p{Y,+X,)  (8.13) 
P, = A-/3 
(2 + 2^ -)4L + (1 + d)(6Y'  + 3K) 
4(l + ^ )(5-75) (8.14) 
Similarly price in the foreign country, in this case, is: 
P ^ = a - p X f  (8.15) 
P f = a - P  (10 +17J)A: + <^{1 + S)1Y'  -6[\  + dYL 
4(l+<5)(5-7S) (8.16) 
Given the above solutions for dumping domain (Dili), it is clear that increase in 
the dumping penalty rate induces the home firm to expand its output whereas the foreign 
firm reduces its sales in the home market with the effect that the total sales in the home 
market falls causing the price to rise in this market. The following comparative statics 
prove this. 
dd ^  
(2<J + ^ ')(24I-21/s:-427") 
(20 + 20<5-7<5^)' 
(8.17) 
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and this can be rewritten as: 
d5  ^  
(2S- \ -6 ' ' ) {m- \n5) \2K  
(20 + 20^-7<5')' 
(8.18) 
The above expression is positive as long as The increase in price, on the one 
hand, leads to an increase in the home firm's profits, and on the other hand, reduces the 
consumer surplus in this country. Thus, we can not say unambiguously which way the 
total welfare of the home country goes as the dumping penalty rate (5) is raised in this 
domain, i.e., we can not analytically sign the expression dWjdS of equation (8.5). Hence 
we resort to numeric simulation to examine the effects of increase in 5 on the home 
country's welfare in this or even beyond this domain. Because when penalty for 
international price discrimination increases and 6 goes beyond S, the foreign firm no 
longer finds it optimal to dump and, therefore, the Nash solution takes place on the 
boundary of Dili and DII domains. As explained earlier the dumping margin reduces to 
zero on the boundary and the home government can not extract any dumping revenues. 
What happens in this case is that the home firm likes the foreign firm to cut back its sales 
in the home market as a reaction to home firm's sales increase, in a similar fashion as it did 
while in domain DIE. But the foreign firm's reduction in its sales in the home market is 
less on boundary and in domain DII as compared to its response to the home firm's move 
in domain Dili which may result in increase in total sales in the home market and, thereby, 
may bring the price in home market down. When the solution to the stage I game is on 
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the boundary, there is no tariff revenue for the home country, therefore, the total welfare 
of the home country reduces to: 
\P,{r,+X,)d(Y,*X,)-cY,-PA (8.19) 
0 
The effect of change in 5 on the home country's welfare, in this case is as follows: 
ss Ph + Ph I J 3S J -C-85  
(8.20) 
" 6 5  6 5  
35  ' 65  65  
(8.21) 
The boundary solution to stage I variables, as we have derived in the last chapter, 
is as follows: 
' {2 + 35) X, = ^ ^  (8.22) 
F=r+-^X, => =¥" +-^^K (8.23) 
1+^ '  '  2+35  
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When the equilibrium occurs on the boundary, the foreign firm's sales in the home market 
are determined by the following rule. 
^ X ^ - Y f + Y '  , , 
i (8.24) 
Therefore, the foreign firm's sale in the home country, in this case are: 
(8.25) 
The total sales in the home market are: 
Y,^ + = Y' +-^^K + + f (8.26) 
" 2  +  3S  2  +  3S  {2  +  3S)  '  
From the above equations, when we substitute 
P; = -/?, (8.27) 
35 (2 + 35)' 
dY° ^ 4K 
95 {2 + 35f 
, and (8.28) 
(8.29) 
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in equation (8.21), we get the following expression for the change in the home country's 
welfare on the boundary when there is a change in 5. 
= {P^ - c)—Y > 0 (8.30) 
^5 ^ " \2 + 35f ' (2 + 3,5)' 
A 
We know, from the previous chapter, that when 5  < 5  < 5  the solution lays along 
the boundary of domains Dili and DII. The above equation implies that if dumping 
penalty rate is increased in this range, it enhances the home country's welfare 
unambiguously. 
For the purpose of numeric simulation, we measure the change in home country's 
welfare slightly differently. Because our model is based on linear demand function, and if 
income distribution considerations are ignored, aggregate social welfare can also be 
measured as the sum of consumer surplus, home firm's profit, and tariff revenue. The 
welfare also depends on the domain in which equilibrium is attained. It is shown that 
imposition of dumping tariff raises the price in the home market which increases the home 
firm's profits but is detrimental to the consumers of the home country in domain DHL 
There is another gainer in this case and that is the home country's government who 
collects dumping penalty from the foreign firm. The antidumping tariflF is some proportion 
(5) of the dumping margin (J) + /) - P;, (^) j and is assessed on each unit of the 
product the foreign firm sells in the home country {X^). 
To start with, we assume that Nash equilibrium takes place in the domain Dili and 
the dumping laws are either not enforced or the dumping penalty rate (5) is zero. When 
the antidumping law is enacted, we trace the effect of this law on the home country's 
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welfare as 5 increases. So the change in the home country's social welfare, AW, is 
measured as follows: 
AW = ACS +AFP + TR 
where AW is the change in social welfare, AFP is the change in the home firm's profit, TR 
is tariff revenue and ACS is the change in consumer surplus. These changes are measured 
from laissez faire (5=0) point and are calculated as follows: 
( n  W + + y > { s = o ) *  = 0 ) )  (8.31) 
AF/>=[n w - C]r,(5) - [A{<5=0) =o) (8.32) 
nm = (8.33) 
The consumers surplus, home firm's profits, and tariff revenues depend on price in 
the home market ( ), price in the foreign market (Py ), home firm's sales in home 
market (Y^), foreign firm's sales in home market (X^), and are ultimately function of the 
dumping tariff rate (6) and the parameters of the model. The terms with 6=0 imply the 
values of these variables when there is no antidumping law in the home country or the 
when the dumping penalty rate is zero and are given below. 
(8.34) 
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X,{S = 0) = i4A:+i4r-8z, 
20 
(8.35) 
P,{S = 0) = A-fi  [ 20 J (8.36) 
Now, by making appropriate substitutions, we can figure out the changes in consumer 
surplus (AC5), home firm's profits (AFP), and the tariflF revenue in order to find out 
change in the home country's total social welfare in the presence of dumping penalty. 
We get an expression for the change m social welfare of the home country by 
adding up the consumers surplus, producers surplus, and tariff revenue fi-om the above 
equations. As can be seen, the social welfare is a function of parameters values of the 
model. We perform numerical simulation to examine the welfare effects of tariff rate 
changes, and see to what extent the results are sensitive to changes in the parameter values 
of the model. 
We have already shown in the previous chapter that there is a sub-space of 
parameter values which ensures the Nash Equilibrium in domain Dili. This parameter 
space is defined by the following restrictions on the parameter values. 
1. 4L-2K-lY" >0 or m>\ and (8.37) 
~ 2UL-2K-1Y') 
ii. 6<d = -^ 
14K + 21Y'-12L 
(8.38) 
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In this type of simple duopoly model imposition of tariff in domain Dili may be 
welfare enhancing for the domestic country because along with the tariflf revenues, a part 
of foreign firm's profit is also transferred to the home firm and together they may more 
than compensate for the loss of consumer surplus fi'om the price increase in the home 
market. But when the dumping penalty rate is more than S, the solution is on the 
boundary and that results in an unambiguous increase in the home country's welfare. 
We first perform numeric simulation by assigning a range of values to demand and 
costs parameters of the model which fulfill the above restrictions and see how the home 
country's social welfare is affected by changes in the antidumping tariff rate (5). The 
following set of tables show the results of this exercise. 
The following tables describe whether or not an optimal dumping penalty rate 
exist, the rate that maximizes the home country's total social welfare for different demand 
and costs conditions in the two countries. It can be seen firom these tables that while in 
domain Dili, the home country's welfare varies with a change in dumping penalty rate (5). 
But there is a local optimum 5 which maximizes the welfare in this domain (6 = 0.3761 in 
Table 3, 6 = 0.2045 in Table 4, and 6 = 0.4 in Table 5). But as soon as the penalty rate is 
increased beyond S the home country's welfare jumps to a higher level and from there it 
increases monotonically with 6, which is as expected since we earlier show that even 
though there are no tariff revenues when the foreign firm does not price discriminate (on 
the boundary or in DII), the welfare is an increasing function of 5 in these domains. We 
have also demonstrated earlier that on the boundary solution total sales in the home 
market go up as 5 increases, i.e., ^3^ + X^)l^5 > o, thereby causing the price in this 
market to fall. This can be noticed here too that the price decreases with an increase in 5 
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Table 3: Simulation I 
A a TJ=7] 5 ACS AFP TR AW 
35 28 6 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 0 
35 28 6 0.0470 -1.5620 1.7254 0.2955 0.4588 
35 28 6 0.0940 -2.9439 3.2653 0.4958 0.8172 
35 28 6 0.1410 -4.1728 4.6447 0.6215 1.0934 
35 28 6 0.1880 -5.2703 5.8840 0.6878 1.3015 
35 28 6 0.2350 -6.2541 7.0004 0.7059 1.4521 
35 28 6 ' 0.2821 -7.1389 8.0080 0.6845 1.5537 
35 28 6 0.3291 -7.9366 8.9191 0.6301 1.6126 
35 28 6 0.3761 -8.6573 9.7436 0.5476 1.6339 
35 28 6 0.4231 -9.3094 10.4905 0.4408 1.6218 
35 28 6 0.4701 -9.9002 11.1670 0.3126 1.5793 
35 28 6 0.5171 -10.4356 11.7796 0.1651 1.5090 
35 28 6 0.5641 -10.9209 12.3338 0 1.4128 
35 28 6 0.7410 -8.2808 17.0498 0 8.7691 
35 28 6 0.9179 -6.2014 20.5977 0 14.3963 
35 28 6 1.0949 -4.5216 23.3606 0 18.8390 
35 28 6 1.2718 -3.1365 25.5713 0 22.4348 
35 28 6 1.4487 -1.9749 27.3795 0 25.4046 
35 28 6 1.6256 -0.9868 28.8853 0 27.8986 
35 28 6 1.8026 -0.1360 30.1584 0 30.0224 
35 28 6 1.9795 0.6041 31.2487 0 31.8528 
35 28 6 2.1564 1.2539 32.1926 0 33.4465 
35 28 6 2.3333 1.8289 33.0178 0 34.8467 
35 28 6 2.5103 1.8289 33.0178 0 34.8467 
35 28 6 2.6872 1.8289 33.0178 0 34.8467 
35 28 6 2.8641 1.8289 33.0178 0 34.8467 
35 28 6 3.0410 1.8289 33.0178 0 34.8467 
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Table 4; Simulation II 
A a TJ=TJ 6 ACS AFP TR AW 
60 45 10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
60 45 10 0.0227 -2.4270 2.6137 0.3144 0.5011 
60 45 10 0.0455 -4.7071 5.0795 0.5498 0.9222 
60 45 10 0.0682 -6.8518 7.4077 0.7149 1.2708 
60 45 10 0.0909 -8.8714 9.6075 0.8174 1.5535 
60 45 10 0.1136 -10.7752 11.6874 0.8636 1.7759 
60 45 10 0.1364 -12.5714 13.6551 0.8593 1.9430 
60 45 10 0.1591 -14.2675 15.5177 0.8091 2.0593 
60 45 10 0.1818 -15.8705 17.2815 0.7174 2.1285 
60 45 10 0.2045 -17.3863 18.9525 0.5877 2.1538 
60 45 10 0.2273 -18.8207 20.5360 0.4231 2.1384 
60 45 10 0.2500 -20.1787 22.0370 0.2265 2.0847 
60 45 10 0.2727 -21.4650 23.4600 0 1.9950 
60 45 10 0.3510 -14.8252 34.5829 0 19.7577 
60 45 10 0.4293 -9.0707 43.8636 0 34.7930 
60 45 10 0.5076 -4.0361 51.7178 0 47.6817 
60 45 10 0.5859 0.4051 58.4461 0 58.8513 
60 45 10 0.6641 4.3518 64.2712 0 68.6230 
60 45 10 0.7424 7.8819 . 69.3612 0 77.2431 
60 45 10 0.8207 11.0580 73.8453 0 84.9033 
60 45 10 0.8990 13.9306 77.8244 0 91.7550 
60 45 10 0.9773 16.5411 81.3784 0 97.9195 
60 45 10 1.0556 18.9239 84.5711 0 103.4950 
60 45 10 1.1338 18.9239 84.5711 0 103.4950 
60 45 10 1.2121 18.9239 84.5711 0 103.4950 
60 45 10 1.2904 18.9239 84.5711 0 103.4950 
60 45 10 1.3687 18.9239 84.5711 0 103.4950 
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Table 5: Simulation in 
A a TJ=TJ 5 ACS AFP TR AW 
35 28 10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
35 28 10 0.0333 -0.7158 1.0371 0.1127 0.4340 
35 28 10 0.0667 -1.3705 1.9897 0.1936 0.8127 
35 28 10 0.1000 -1.9707 2.8662 Q2A16 1.1431 
35 28 10 0.1333 -2.5223 3.6742 0.2789 1.4307 
35 28 10 0.1667 -3.0303 4.4202 0.2907 1.6806 
35 28 10 0.2000 -3.4990 5.1098 0.2857 1.8965 
35 28 10 0.2333 -3.9320 5.7480 0.2660 2.0820 
35 28 10 0.2667 -4.3326 6.3392 0.2335 2.2400 
35 28 10 0.3000 -4.7038 6.8871 0.1896 2.3729 
35 28 10 0.3333 -5.0479 7.3952 0.1354 2.4827 
35 28 10 0.3667 -5.3671 7.8665 0.0719 2.5714 
35 28 10 0.4000 -5.6634 8.3038 0 2.6403 
35 28 10 0.5267 -4.0222 12.8223 0 8.8000 
35 28 10 0.6533 -2.6785 16.4036 0 13.7251 
35 28 10 0.7800 -1.5583 19.3107 0 17.7524 
35 28 10 0.9067 -0.6103 21.7168 0 21.1065 
35 28 10 1.0333 0.2024 23.7408 0 23.9432 
35 28 10 1.1600 0.9067 25.4666 0 26.3733 
35 28 10 1.2867 1.5229 26.9556 0 28.4785 
35 28 10 1.4133 2.0666 28.2531 0 30.3197 
35 28 10 1.5400 2.5499 29.3938 0 31.9437 
35 28 10 1.6667 2.9822 30.4044 0 33.3867 
35 28 10 1.7933 2.9822 30.4044 0 33.3867 
35 28 10 1.9200 2.9822 30.4044 0 33.3867 
35 28 10 2.0467 2.9822 30.4044 0 33.3867 
35 28 10 2.1733 2.9822 30.4044 0 33.3867 
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so much so that it even falls belovi^ the laissez faire price level in the home country 
= O)) and ACS becomes positive at this point. This can be seen when S >0.6041 in 
Table 3, 5 >0.4051 in Table 4, and d ^0.2024. A further increase in the dumping penalty 
rate beyond S ( for parameter values in Table 3, ^ = 2.3333, in Table 2, S = 1.0556, and 
for Table 5, S = 1.667) puts the solution in domain DII where it becomes independent of 5 
and the home country's welfare increases further, from here it can be concluded that it 
pays to a country in this situation to raise the dumping penalty rate (5) so high that the 
foreign firm is forced not to price discriminate (solution in DII) and that would maximize 
the country's welfare. 
This is contrary to the claims made by the US Commerce Department and also by 
other industrialized countries that dumping penalty they impose is equal to the dumping 
margin which we have been referring to as remedial tariff. In the context of our model this 
implies 5 =1. How far the regulatory agencies are able to estimate the dumping margins 
correctly is a separate debate, but the exporters claim that these margins are in general 
overestimated in favor of domestic industry. In our model this would make the value of 6 
greater than 1. If we examine whether remedial and punitive tariff can be beneficial for the 
home country under diflferent demand and cost conditions, we find in these tables that any 
punitive penalty rate (6 > 1) can be welfare enhancing for the home country. In all cases 
change in home county's welfare is positive whenever such a tariff is imposed. 
If we assume that a country is constrained by some obligation that does not allow 
it to increase the dumping penalty rate 5 beyond S then another factor which seems to 
affect the optimal penalty rate choice in our model is the fixed or the capacity cost, 
77 and rj. When we increase capacity costs for both the home and the foreign firms while 
holding all other parameter values constant, the optimal dumping penalty rate increases. In 
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Table 3 and 5 we change values 77 = 77 from 6 to 10, we find that optimal 6 increase from 
0.3761 to 0.400. We can replicate this trend for other sets of parameters too. 
Now we analyze the situation when the home and foreign firms' best response 
curves intersect in domain DI, and dumping does not take place in laissez faire 
equilibrium. The restriction on the parameter values, that we laid down in the previous 
chapter, which ensure crossing of the two firms' best response curves in domain DI is 
rt7 < 1. Further restrictions that may cause intersection of the best response functions of 
the two firms in domain DII or on the boundary of DII and Dili along with in DI are as 
follows: 
Griven Jsr+(T<2, (8.39) 
We assign numeric values to all the parameters of our model which fiilfill the 
above conditions and see if there are multiple local solutions. We also try to find if a 
global solution exists.  By using one set of values, A = \0Q,5 = 60, P = 2,C = C = A, 
77 = 77 = 6, and / = 1, generate Table 6. With these parameter values, 5 = 0.2342 which 
implies that if 0 < 5 < 0.2342, the solution is in domain DI and possibly on the boundary, 
and if ^ > 0.2342, the solution is in DI and may also be in DII. The pairs of solution 
values in different regions, are given in columns 2 and 3 of the table which show 
that as 5 increases the foreign and home firms' best response curves intersect each other at 
the boundary or in DII as well as in DI. rtf, is the home firm's profit associated with 
if best response curves cross in DII, (8.40) 
if <5<5 best response curves cross at the boundary. (8.41) 
Table 6: Simulation IV 
d Y, Y,\Xf) ACS APS AW Acs(r/) APS(7/) Aw(y/) 
0.0000 25.65 18.20 668.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.0300 24.64 20.22 18.54 710.58 712.99 73.58 33.65 107.23 -74.15 42.78 -31.36 
0.0600 24.31 20.88 18.65 727.18 731.59 88.51 47.61 136.12 -107.30 60.95 -46.35 
0.0900 24.01 21.48 18.75 742.07 748.87 102.35 60.08 162.43 -137.68 77.82 -59.86 
0.1200 23.73 22.04 18.84 755.51 764.96 115.22 71.28 186.49 -165.61 93.54 -72.08 
0.1500 23.47 22.56 18.93 767.67 779.97 127.21 81.37 208.58 -191.38 108.20 -83.18 
0.1800 23.23 23.04 19.01 778.73 794.02 138.41 90.50 228.91 -215.24 121.93 -93.31 
0.2100 23.00 23.49 19.08 788.83 807.18 148.90 98.80 247.70 -237.37 134.79 -102.58 
0.2342 22.83 23.83 796.36 156.90 104.97 261.86 
0.3192 22.83 23.83 796.36 156.90 104.97 261.86 
0.4042 22.83 23.83 796.36 156.90 104.97 261.86 
0.4892 22.83 23.83 796.36 156.90 104.97 261.86 
0.5742 22.83 23.83 796.36 156.90 104.97 261.86 
0.6592 22.83 23.83 796.36 156.90 104.97 261.86 
0.7442 22.83 23.83 796.36 156.90 104.97 261.86 
A = m,a = 60,p = 2,C = C=A,Ti = li  = 6,t  = \  
^ = 27.1164 
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corresponding solution values. At the boundary the solution value for the foreign and 
home firm is Xf ,7,^, respectively. But given the solution output of the foreign firm at the 
boundary, Xf, the home firm can also choose another (lower) output by using the 
solution rule i?,, i.e., Yf :Ii,(^Xf^ = 0, and this is calculated in colunm 4 of Table 6. When 
we compare the home firm's profit associated with this response given in 
column 6, with its profits resulting firom its output on the boundary, we find that 
Therefore, the home firm would like to have output Vf instead 
of its solution output as its response to the foreign firm's output X f .  However, this 
cannot be an equilibrium because Xf is not the foreign firm's best response to the home 
firm's F/, its best output is a lot more than Xf in this case. Therefore, no-dumping 
solution in domain DI will prevail ultimately and will be the global solution in this case. 
This may be due to the fact that with these parameter values the jump in the home firm's 
best response fiinction fi-om R^toR2 occurs aX X = 27.1164which is even greater than the 
solution value of X, in DI (-X"/). 
We simulate the same no-dumping solution, this time with a different set of 
parameter values, A = l95,S = llO,fi = 2,C = C =4,7j = lj = 7, and/ = 1, and the results 
are shown in Table 7 where all the variables are the same as defined in Table 6 with an 
additional column where value of X^ is caculated. For these parameter values 
S = 0.13 82 and the jump in the home firm's best response fiinction fi-om i?, toi?^ occurs at 
X = 48.56which is greater than the solution value of X, in DEE and less than the solution 
value X, in DII. Now in laissez faire case ( when there is no dumping law) dumping does 
not take place in equilibrium. However, if antidumping law is introduced in the home 
country and penalty for dumping ( 5 ) is gradually raised, equilibrium may shifl; to the 
regions where decisions of firms are affected by the antidumping law. As can be noticed 
Table 7: Simulation VI 
s y, Y.'iXf) ACS APS AW A 
CS(K/) 
A 
ps(y/) 
Aw(y/) ^4 
0.0000 52.00 37.00 2450 0 0 0 58.00 
0.0300 48.79 43.42 38.07 2629 2711 517 153 671 -439 257 -182 54.81 
0.0600 48.14 44.72 38.29 2679 2784 579 198 777 -571 330 -241 52.10 
0.0770 47.79 45.42 38.40 2705 2824 611 221 833 -641 369 -272 50.74 
0.1070 47.22 46.56 38.59 2746 2890 666 259 924 .757 434 -323 48.60 
0.1370 46.69 47.63 38.77 2784 2951 716 292 1008 -863 494 -369 46.74 
0.1670 46.19 48.61 38.94 2818 3008 763 322 1085 -962 551 -411 45.09 
0.1970 45.74 49.53 39.09 2849 3062 807 349 1156 -1053 604 -449 43.64 
0.1382 46.67 47.67 38.78 2785 2953 718 293 1011 -867 497 -371 46.67 
0.2232 46.67 47.67 39.21 2785 2952 718 293 1011 -793 494 -299 42.49 
0.3082 46.67 47.67 39.57 2785 2951 718 293 1011 -732 491 -241 39.42 
0.3932 46.67 47.67 39.87 2785 2950 718 293 1011 -680 489 -192 37.07 
0.4782 46.67 47.67 40.13 2785 2948 718 293 1011 -636 486 -150 35.22 
0.5632 46.67 47.67 40.35 2785 2947 718 293 1011 -598 484 -114 33.71 
0.6482 46.67 47.67 40.54 2785 2945 718 293 1011 -565 481 -83 32.46 
^ = 195,a = 110,y3 = 2,C = C =4,77 = ^ = 7,/ = ! 
X = 48.56 
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that if ^ < 0.1382, we have intersection of theforeign and home firms' best response curves 
in DI and on the boundary. However the domain DI solution dominates for the same 
reasons explained in the previous paragraph. But when S = 0.1070, the jump in the home 
firm's best response curve takes place fi-om i?, to the intersection point of and the 
boundary which has been defined as [X^ = 48.6 when S = 0.1070). This causes 
existence of multiple solutions in no-dumping domain DI (A'/ = 52), at the jump 
= 48.56), and at the boundary of DEI and Dili (Z,® = 46.22). Further increase in 5, 
beyond 0.1070, soon makes X^ < Xf = 46.67, and that results in muhiple solutions in 
domains DI, DII, and at X (X/ =52, X = 48.56, and Xf = 46.67). Which of these 
solutions would prevail, we can not say anything for sure. Some sort of trade policy like 
VER or some other type of government intervention may be able to force one of these 
solution over the others. To analyze this we need to put more structure in our model. 
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APPENDIX A 
We will examine here whether there exist such X, which makes home firm's profit 
in domain DI exactly equal toits profits in domain D 11. 
X^, X2 are defined in chapter 6 as follows: 
X,/X-R,(X,X) = 0 (A.1) 
X,=2L~Y '  (A.2 )  
X,l X-R,{X,r) = 0 (A.3) 
X,=2L-3Y' '  (A.4) 
X^ > X^ (A.5) 
Now I define X e(^,, X^) s.t. (A.6) 
xlx-?t,(X,r,) = ?r,{x,Y,) (A.7) 
where 
= 0 (A.8) 
Y,/Y-.R, (x ,Y,) = (i (A.9) 
The home firm's profits in the domain DI are: 
={A-pY,-pX,)Y,-{C+ri)Y, (A.10) 
7i,=(A-{C+ri)-pY,-pX,)Y, (A.11) 
Where 
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y^=-
4 2 
-, and L 
P 
(A. 12) 
Therefore, when substitutions are made for Xf, and L, Uj becomes: 
7t, = (A.13) 
K , = \ L -£ _ r  2 4 \pr,-^pr^ (A.14) 
After substituting for Y^, the above expression reduces to the folloAving. 
M  2  4 ) 3  (A.15) 
Similarly, the home firm's profits in domain DII are: 
7i„=(A-l)r^-pX,)Y^-(C+-n)Y^ , (A.16) 
and values of and in this domain are : 
i; = 
2 2 
(A. 17) 
After substituting for ^2 and and simplification, DII profits are: 
1 
2 2 2 
(A.i8) 
To find out if DI and DII profits are identical at certain X ^  = X ,  we compare 
%jand%jj.  
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= .P L-^1-2 
V 
r — —  
2 
j j   ' 
I 4 2j (A. 19) 
Let ^ = L , then 
2 
^11-5, =^-{3 
^ ( •yc  ^ 2 "  
- 2  
I 2j l 4j 
r 7=y 
— -3W-2M["-2 
2 
/-ycY 
— +w 
4 i 
S„-S, =|{|(5")'-2>I'r+>!"} 
If profits in domain DI and DII are same at some point, then 
^(7'')'-2W"+^' =0 
Applying the quadratic formula yields the following roots for the above equation. 
2r ±. 
(A.20) 
(A.21) 
(A.22) 
(A.23) 
(A.24) 
»F = 1 
2 5 2 4r -4-r 
8 
^ = Y' ±Y' 
= 1.6124r 
T, = 0.38761"^ 
Root 1 
Root 2 
(A.25) 
(A.26) 
(A.27) 
(A.28) 
We use root 2 because root 2 s? (-Yj, ) 
= Z - ^  =  1 . 6 1 2 4 r  
' 2 
(A.29) 
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Therefore, if 
Xf > 2{L -1.61247'') R1 is the relevant solution rule and if (A.30) 
Xt<2{L-1.61247") R2 is the relevant solution rule. (A.31) 
Thus, a discontinuity in the home firm's reaction Sanction occurs at 
X, =1 = 2(1-1.16247") (A.32) 
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APPENDIX B 
Here we look for values of which make the home firm's profits alike in domain DI and 
on the boundry. For this purpose we define a fiinction G()Q such that 
G{X) = 7UI-7I:[=0 (B.l) 
where ;rf is the home firm's profit on the boundry of domaim D11 and D III and is it 
profits in domain DI and if we can show the existence of roots of the Sanction G(X)=0, 
those are the vallues of X^ which tie the home firm's profits in DI and on B. From 
Appendix A we have profits in DI 
;  ( .  X  r V y f f  
and profits on the boundry are; 
-(C+ri)Y, (B.3) 
(B.4) 
1 + o 
(2 + S) Y'  Y 
X , = \  ' r X , + -  ^  ( B . 5 )  
' 4(1 + 5) '44 
When the values of Y, and X^ on the boundry are substituted, we get the following profit 
Sanction on the bioundry. 
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n l = p { L - r - (l + 2g) 
2(1 + ^ ) ' r + -\+5 (B.6) 
At this point we further define grouping of some parameters that will facilitate the algebric 
menapulations. In chapter IV we defined 
J = 4L-2K-1Y' .  Now, let (B.7) 
W = 4L-2K-6Y' '  
and 
(B.8) 
W K 3 
— -  — = a = L- -Y ' ' ,  Therefore 
4 2 2 
(B.9) 
Y" Y"  5 L-Y'  =a + —and L-  — = a+-Y'  
2 4 4 
When these are substituted in the above profit fianctions, we get 
{\ + 2S) 
a(x)=fi  rj { a + — 
.1 I 2 J   2(1 + 5) 
G{X) = --f-3a7" --7°' +«" +—7^' +-a7=l 
3v 2 16 2 / 
f-6(l + 2S)Y'' + 12<5a + eSY' + 4(1 + S)a + 5(1 + S)Y' 
[ 12(1+ (5) 
-x: 
d{ l+2S)  ^  1 
2{ \  +  S)  12 
(B.IO) 
(B.ll) 
(B.12) 
g(x)=4 
, 4 J '13(1+5), 12 • 
5(1 + 25) 1 , „ 
^ — S' = 0 (B.13) 
2(i+<^y 12J 
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The roots are found by the quadratic formula. 
[3(l+<5) 12 J ^ l3(l + 5) 12 J 
1 11 
A  4 j | 2 ( l + 5 f  1 2 j  
M \ + 2 s)^  r  
|2(l+5)' 12 • 
(B.14) 
Since we have shown the existence of the roots, therefore, it implies that at 
= X' the home firm's profits same in domain DI and on the boundry (B), thus the is a 
possible jump from DI to B in the home fir's best response curve. 
